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SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT: THE
INTERPLAY OF STATISTICS, JUDGMENT, AND
PROCEDURE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
David E. Adelman*
INTRODUCTION

Americans have a love-hate relationship with science. 1 We receive minute-by-minute updates of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
and the NASDAQ read news accounts of recent medical studies on
the risks from diseases, and track scientific reports estimating the annual increase in average global temperature from greenhouse gases.
All of these numbers involve elaborate forms of statistical analysis and
testing, and we rely to a great extent on the good faith and presumed
objectivity of the scientists and economists involved to ensure that the
numbers are accurate. As the recent accounting scandals and space
shuttle disaster in the United States have demonstrated, however, defining statistical measures and ensuring accuracy are far from trivial
tasks-even in areas many people assume are readily amenable to
* Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona;
B.A., Reed College, 1988; Ph.D., Stanford University, 1993;J.D., Stanford Law School,
1996. For helpful comments, the author thanks Graeme Austin, John Barton, Ellen
Bublick, Robert Glennon, Stephen Goldberg, Greg Mandel, Toni Massaro, Jamie
Ratner, Carol Rose, Dalia Tsuk, Elliot Weiss, and David Wexler; special thanks to
David Kaye, Mark Kelman, and Ted Schneyer.
1 Recent surveys suggest that many Americans have conflicting attitudes towards
science. A 2002 report published by the National Science Foundation (NSF) found
that "[i]n general, Americans express highly favorable attitudes toward [science and
technology]." NAT'L SCIENCE BoARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS-2002, at
7-12 (2002), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind02/pdfstart.htm. At the
same time, many Americans believe that "people would do better by living a simpler
life without so much technology" (44%) and that "technological discoveries will eventually destroy the Earth" (about 30%). Id. at 7-13. Even more striking, approximately
50% of the people surveyed agreed that "[w]e depend too much on science and not
enough on faith." Id. Moreover, for hotly contested technologies, such as genetic
engineering and nuclear power, public confidence in science is much lower. Id. at 716 to 7-17, 7-21.
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meaningful quantification. 2 These kinds of failures have led Americans to question the reliability and value of such scientific methods
3
and to question the role of science in society more generally.
Similar schisms exist over how science is used in setting environmental policy. For most critics of environmental regulation, broad reliance on science is viewed as progress towards increased rationality
and objectivity. 4 For many environmentalists, however, the presumed

authority of science has engendered far greater concern and opposition. Environmentalists argue that science is too uncertain to resolve
regulatory choices, that it is inaccessible to the general public, and

2

See Kurt Eichenwald, Pushing Accounting Rules to the Edge of the Envelope, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at CI (commenting that "quarterly financial reports are far from

the precise things that investors dream them to be"); Michael H. Granof & Stephen A.
Zeff, Generally Accepted AccountingAbuses, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2002, at A27 (observing
that despite what investors might like to believe, "accounting rules are hardly objective[;] [t]hey are open to interpretation-and, of course, manipulation-and there is
often more than one reasonable way to measure expenses or revenues"); John
Schwartz, Computer Program That Analyzed Shuttle Damage Was Misused, Engineer Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at A9 (concluding that a computer program "helped NASA
mistakenly decide that the shuttle Columbia had not been deeply harmed"); John
Schwartz & Matthew L. Wald, Echoes of Challenger: Shuttle Panel Considers Longstanding
Flaws in NASA's System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, at A27 (noting that "the seemingly
hard numbers of the Boeing analysis [of the impact of falling debris] appeared at the
time to trump the gut feelings of the engineers" and may have contributed to the loss
of the space shuttle).
3 NAT'L SCIENCE BOARD., supra note 1, at 7-16 to 7-17, 7-21 to 7-23 (noting that
public support for space exploration dropped dramatically following the Challenger
space shuttle accident and that recent negative publicity regarding genetic engineering has contributed to its diminishing level of public acceptance).
4 See, e.g., BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTIcAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE
REAL STATE OF THE WORLD 348 (2001) (urging the need for a "strong regulation system" based on sound science); Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law,
280 SCIENCE 537, 537-38 (1998) (observing that "there is an increasingly important

need for law to reflect sound science"); Frank B. Cross, The Subtle Vices Behind Environmental Values, 8 DuKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 151, 151 (1997) ("Reliance on science is
broadly consistent with liberty and democracy. These values of the scientific method
are far more valid than some of the values underlying public risk perceptions."); John
D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less Cost,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 41-43 (discussing, as current Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget, the
merits of a sound science approach to environmental regulation); William Reilly, Tak-

ing Aim Toward 2000: Rethinking The Nation's Environmental Agenda, 21 ENVrL. L. 1359,
1362 (1991) (commenting, as the former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, that "sound science is our most reliable anchor in a turbulent sea of

environmental policy and regulation").
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that it is often used to mask questions of social values. 5 Underlying
much of this concern is a general skepticism of scientific expertise
and opposition to the antidemocratic overtones of delegating decisionmaking authority to a scientific elite. Yet, in spite of these conflicts, science continues to dominate environmental decisionmaking.
The "best available science," for example, is the established standard
for regulatory decisions under many environmental statutes, 6 and science is used in political and legal battles to justify, defend, and challenge environmental laws. Moreover, scientific methods, such as costbenefit analysis and risk assessment, have become the common metrics of environmental regulation.
The controversy over the role of science in environmental policymaking is at base about the proper scope of scientific discretion.
The debate first ignited around risk assessment methods used to derive regulatory standards for industrial chemicals. 7 Risk assessment
created a furor because uncertainties in risk estimates are often very
5

See, e.g., Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J.

ENVTL. L. 119, 126 (2003) (arguing that "current scientific theories about risk make a
poor starting point for regulatory standard setting"); Devra Lee Davis, The "Shotgun
Wedding" of Science and Law: Risk Assessment andJudicialReview, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
67 (1985) (describing the misuse and limitations of risk assessment in the context of
judicial review); SheilaJasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of
JudicialCompetence, 214 SCIENCE 1211, 1213 (1981) (commenting that scientific uncer-

tainty can mistakenly "lead both scientists and regulators to recommend inaction"
and often may "encourage litigants to translate questions of social value into technical
discourse"); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5

89, 90 (1988) ("challeng[ing] the conventional view that scientific
perspectives should dominate the risk-assessment process"); Th6mas 0. McGarity,

YALE J. ON REG.

Substantive andProceduralDiscretion in AdministrativeResolution of Science Policy Questions:
Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 781 (1979) (arguing that

federal regulation of carcinogens cannot be dictated by science, but must instead be
resolved using a results-oriented approach); Wendy E.Wagner, Congress, Science, and
Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 181 (asserting that "Congress has put

too much emphasis on scientific data-operating under the mistaken belief that science, alone, can provide the solutions to environmental problems"); Wendy E.Wagner, The Science Charadein Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1629 (1995)

[hereinafter Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation] (arguing that "[a]gency scientists and bureaucrats engage in a 'science charade' by failing first to identify the major interstices
left by science in the standard-setting process and second to reveal the policy choices
they made to fill each trans-scientific gap").
6 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (2000) ("best
scientific and commercial data available"); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(a) (1) ("reflecting the latest scientific knowledge"); Safe Drinking Water Act,
42 U.S.C. § 3 00 g-I (b) (3) (A) ("best available, peer-reviewed science");'Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2) ("reflect the latest scientific knowledge").
7

See supra note 5.
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large at the low exposure levels most relevant to regulatory standards.
Opposition also was heightened because, unlike many science-policy
disputes, the problem is easily understood: The harm from most toxic
chemicals at low exposure levels falls below the detection limits of existing testing methods. As a result, scientists must make judgments, or
educated guesses, about the behavior of a chemical's toxicity at low
exposure levels to fill this gap in the data. Environmentalists have
cried foul on the ground that such judgments are matters of social
value that lie outside the jurisdiction of scientific expertise, and objected to risk methods because they transform a question of policy
into obscure technical details.8 Regulatory critics are also hostile towards broad scientific discretion, but they view risk assessment methods as the solution, not the problem. 9 Their ire is directed at fuzzy
qualitative science, which they describe pejoratively as 'junk science"
and consider to be presumptively suspect. For regulatory critics, risk
assessment methods are by definition legitimate because they are
quantitative and inductive. 10
The positions on both poles of this debate are one-sided. Most
significantly, they fail to recognize that good science encompasses logically deductive and inductive methods, as well as broad scientific values, such as simplicity, breadth, and consistency."l In other words,
science involves a mix of qualitative judgments (based on broad principles) and quantitative data. This Article deviates from the standard
debate insofar as it focuses on the underlying scientific methods them8 SeeJasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 5, at 1213; Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation,
supra note 5, at 1629.
9 See generally RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETIING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (criticizing the current system where regulatory
policy is set based on political pragmatism and highlighting key issues underlying risk
assessment); Graham, supra note 4, at 14 (calling for Congress to pass a statute requiring the Executive Office of the President to create an "explicit, rigorous process of
priority setting" among and within the various risk protection agencies).
10 This general veneration of risk assessment methods should not be read to imply that regulatory critics are not critical of certain approaches to risk assessment,
such as the use of overly conservative assumptions. See, e.g., Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, 10 REGULATION 13, 17-19 (Nov./Dec. 1986) (describing how regulatory policy is

distorted by the use of conservative risk assessments); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the
Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1437 (1996) (explaining how agencies use conservative risk estimates that "institutionalize an irrational form of economic
behavior").
11 Thomas S. Kuhn considered both rigorous methods, which he referred to as
normal science, and "idiosyncratic factors" based on these scientific values to be essential ingredients of scientific progress. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSETIAL TENSION
329-31 (1977).
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selves, not purported misapplications of them. The Article examines
the role of scientific discretion in environmental law by evaluating
how scientific judgment is shaped by scientific methods-particularly
statistical techniques. Three stages of scientific judgment will be examined: (1) reducing experimental information to quantitative results; (2) drawing inferences from discrete scientific studies; and (3)
integrating the results of multiple experimental studies for purposes
of setting environmental policies.
Statistical methods are of central importance to scientific judgment and to this Article. I will argue that statistics should be understood as a formal system for structuring how expert judgment is
integrated into scientific determinations. Two theories of statistical
inference will be described: "frequentism," which is based on methods
for controlling and minimizing error rates in statistical models; and
"Bayesianism," which is founded on a theorem for combining experimental results and scientific judgments that satisfies certain principles
of logical coherence.1 2 The two theories differ in their basic analytical
approach. Frequentism uses objective standards of "statistical significance" to ensure that statistical methods stringently test scientific hypotheses, whereas Bayesian methods derive the probability that a
hypothesis is true based on subjective scientific judgments and the
available data. These differences are pivotal because they result in divergent approaches to conducting and interpreting statistical analyses
and because they generate results that often differ substantially. 13
The important elements to appreciate initially are the basic contrasts
between the two theories: frequentism is defined by measures of statistical significance, objective frequencies, and rigorous testing; Bayesianism is based upon direct probabilities, subjective judgments, and
logical coherence. These differences cause the two methods to incorporate expert judgments into scientific assessments very differently.
Describing and explaining scientific methods, as the preceding
paragraph evidences, presents its own. set of challenges. I hope to
minimize these impediments by drawing on parallels that exist between legal and scientific methods (some of which are interesting in
their own right). The basic premise of this approach is that scientific
and judicial judgment bear many similarities in how they are struc12 See IAn HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILI' AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC
127-28, 171-73, 190 (2001); M.S. Bartlett, Probabilityand Chance in the Theory of Statistics, 141 PROC. ROYAL Soc'v LONDON 518, 528-29 (1933); see also infra Part V.A.
13 The more common frequentist significance testing employs statistical model
error rates to evaluate whether a scientific hypothesis is refuted by observed data.
Bayesian analyses, in contrast, use experimental data to estimate the degree of belief,
often referred to as epistemic probability, a hypothesis warrants.
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tured. Important parallels exist at three levels: the interpretive theories that delimit judicial review and scientific judgment, the allocation
of burdens of proof in judicial and scientific judgments, and the regulatory models and methodological rules that structure judicial and scientific judgments, respectively. These parallel features map directly
onto the three stages of scientific judgment described above-interpretive principles onto stage one, burdens of proof onto stage two,
and procedural rules and regulatory models onto stage three. The
similarities between the legal and scientific frameworks will be drawn
upon at each stage, as demonstrated below.
Stage 1. Interpretive theories ofjudicial review mirror those used
in science. Judicial review is practiced according to interpretive principles that range from strict formalism to antiformalism.14 Stated simply, formalism limits judges to the plain language of a statute or the
Constitution; antiformalism denies that such a plain meaning can be
discerned in most cases and presumes judges will invoke principles
beyond the specific statutory or constitutional provisions in question. 15 Scientific positivism and relativism parallel these two branches
of legal thought. In its most basic form, positivism views scientific
facts as speaking for themselves and scientific methods merely as
16
means for collecting and interpreting the plain meaning of data.
Relativism rejects this passive model of science, holding instead that
scientific facts are neither univocal nor free-floating-where judges
require external principles to resolve the meaning of a statutory provi17
sion, scientists require theories to make sense of experimental data.
Judges and scientists, in this light, are both subject to being labeled
activists and condemned for either their formalist or antiformalist
methods. For example, environmentalists' objections to risk methods
are in essence objections to a form of "scientific activism" in which
scientists (improperly) extrapolate beyond a strict reading of the limited facts available. The legal and scientific debates both raise challenging questions about the proper scope of expert judgment and
discretion.
14 Examples of strict formalism include texualism and originalism; examples of
antiformalism include legal pragmatism and rights based theories. See JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-3 (1980); Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1063, 1064-65 (1981); Thomas C. Grey, JudicialReview and Legal Pragmatism,38 WAKE
FOREST

15

L. Rv. 473, 478 (2003).

16

See Brest, supra note 14, at 1064-65.
See infra Part II.B.

17

See infra Part II.B.
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Stage 2. Burdens of proof in environmental law and science often
overlap because environmental standards are generally based on scientific evidence. This connection is borne out by the fact that the
controversy over regulatory burdens of proof has often focused on statistics. The other important element of the debate is the Precautionary Principle, which environmentalists have long used to argue that
regulated industries should bear the burden of proving that their
products and activities are safe.' 8 Environmentalists object to traditional statistical methods (i.e., frequentist) because they improperly
place the scientific burden of proof on proponents of environmental
regulation by implicitly starting with a baseline assumption that no
harm exists. 19 Environmentalists consequently consider the bias of

frequentist methods to be a central impediment to their decades-long
effort to reform methods of scientific inference for purposes of environmental standard setting. These objections raise important questions about how statistical methods are used by scientists and the
relationship between standards of statistical significance and legal burdens of persuasion.
Stage 3. It is a simple truism that legal rules and scientific methods shape how scientific standards are established in environmental
law. More significant, however, is the observation that the two central
models found in law and science are structurally similar-in both contexts, one model is procedurally oriented and the other expertise
based. For legal academics, risk assessment methods are the example
of choice in the contest between the two models. For example, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and professor Wendy Wagner
have both used toxics risk assessment to illuminate the virtues of each
approach.2 0 Breyer argues for an expert model based on establishing
a politically insulated scientific elite within the government to resolve
difficult scientific problems. 2 1 Wagner advocates a procedural approach that is designed to ensure that matters of scientific fact and
environmental policy are made transparent and clearly distinguished
from each other. 22 The central difference between their proposals is
that where Wagner seeks to separate the science from the policy,
Breyer lumps expert judgment together with empirical observations.
Scientists also have an obvious interest in controlling how scientific judgments are made and used in environmental policymaking.
18
19
20

See infra Part III (describing the Precautionary Principle).
See infra Part III.
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGU-

42-50 (1993); Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1613-17.
supra note 20, at 59-61, 80-81.
Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1701-03, 1711-20.

LATION

21

22

BREYER,
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The focus of the scientific debate, however, is on statistical methods23
one side propounding a frequentist approach, the other a Bayesian.
Frequentists occupy the proceduralist camp with their objective testing methods and attention to analytical transparency. 24 Bayesians, in
the other, embrace an expert model that integrates scientific judgments directly into statistical analyses. 25 Among scientists, climate
change research has become a flash point for this methodological
standoff. For example, Professor Stephen Schneider, a prominent climate scientist and environmentalist, has argued tirelessly on behalf of
Bayesian methods because he believes they ensure that the judgments
26
of scientific experts are adequately considered by policymakers.
Schneider's campaign has met with significant opposition. Frequentist critics claim that Bayesian methods will further politicize environmental science because they incorporate subjective judgments, which
naturally reflect a scientist's personal biases.2 7 Policymakers will, as a
result, have to contend with a plethora of Bayesian estimates that vary
from scientist to scientist, rather than a single frequentist analysis of
the data. The choice between frequentist and Bayesian methods
therefore implicates the debate over regulatory models used in environmental policymaking, and vice versa.
This Article examines the role of scientific discretion in environmental law and describes the interplay between scientific judgment,
23

See, e.g., COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN

(1989) (explaining the analytical underpinnings of Bayesian methods and
arguing that it is a superior method); DEBORAH G. MAYO, ERROR AND THE GROWTH OF
EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE (1996) (providing a standard book on the analytical un-

APPROACH

derpinnings of frequentist methods); Brian Dennis, Should EcologistsBecome Bayesians?,
6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1095 (1996) (analyzing the weaknesses and limitations of
Bayesian methods); Aaron M. Ellison, An Introduction to Bayesian Inference for Ecological
Research and Environmental Decision-Making, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1036 (1996)

(describing the virtues of Bayesian analysis relative to traditional frequentist methods);Jim Giles, When Doubt is a Sure Thing, 418 NATURE 476 (2002) (reporting on the
dispute over Bayesian and frequentist methods among climate scientists); David
Malakoff, Bayes Offers a 'New' Way to Make Sense of Numbers, 286 SCIENCE 1460 (1999)

(reporting on the rise of Bayesian methods by scientists); Stephen H. Schneider, What
Is 'Dangerous'Climate Change?, 411 NATURE 17 (2001) (advocating the use of Bayesian
methods in climate change policy); LaraJ. Wolfson et al., Bayesian EnvironmentalPolicy
Decisions: Two Case Studies, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1056 (1996) (demonstrating
how Bayesian methods can be used in environmental policymaking).
24 MAYo, supra note 23, at 10.
25 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26 See Giles, supra note 23, at 476-77; Schneider, supra note 23, at 18.
27 See Giles, supra note 23, at 477-78. A scientist from the private sector, for
example, will presumably derive very different Bayesian estimates of pollutant levels in
a stream than a scientist from an environmental group.
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statistics, and procedure in environmental policy. Part I of the Article
sets the stage with a brief introduction to statistics. The core sections
of the Article, Parts II through IV, follow the three-stage framework
described above. Part II discusses the legal and scientific debates over
quantitative methods in environmental policy and challenges the
dominant theories of science found in legal scholarship. I reject the
prevailing theories in favor of an experimentally grounded approach
that acknowledges the central role of qualitative judgments in science
and the difficult balancing that is required to protect the integrity of
science while ensuring transparency and political accountability. Part
III addresses the debate over burdens of proof in environmental law,
and uses several rationales for the Precautionary Principle to evaluate
common misconceptions and concerns about the use of frequentist
methods in environmental science. I show that statistical tests are
more flexible than most people appreciate and propose a solution to
environmentalists' concerns-"equivalence testing"-that reverses the
benign-until-proven-guilty presumption of traditional frequentist
methods. 28 Finally, Part IV evaluates the competing virtues of Bayesian and frequentist methods for structuring how scientific judgments
are made and analyzes their parallels with the legal models Breyer and
Wagner propose. Both statistical theories are found to have practical
limitations and to present important interpretive challenges. I conclude by describing an alternative to the two legal models that alleviates the shortcomings of the statistical methods by integrating them
with standard legal procedures. This approach has two additional
benefits: it enhances the range of options available to guide scientific
judgment in environmental policy, and it promotes a deeper appreciation on the part of lawyers and policymakers for the limits and
strengths of scientific methods.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO BAYEIAN AND FREQUENTIST METHODS OF
STATISTICAL INFERENCE

Statistics is often mistakenly viewed as a collection of related techniques that lack any substantive content. 29 Statistics in fact consists of
28 See Roger L. Berger &Jason C. Hsu,.Bioequivalence Trials, Intersection-Union Tests
and Equivalence Confidence Sets, 11 STAT. Sci. 283, 283-84 (1996); Graham B. McBride,
Equivalence Tests Can Enhance Environmental Science Management, 41 AUSTL. & N.Z. J.
STAT. 19, 20 (1999).
29 Statistics is no more a collection of descriptive techniques void of theoretical
content than legal procedures are independent of substantive objectives. Yet, as early
as the Progressive Era, statisticians sought to separate their technical work from its
potential political implications. See THEODORE M. PORTER, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL
THINKING 1820-1900, at 23-39 (1986). "Partly as a defensive move, and partly to reas-
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certain mathematical theorems and models of scientific inference that
are premised on substantive beliefs about nature. 30 It also functions
in two distinct modes. First, statistics encompasses a collection of
mathematical techniques (e.g., means, medians, probability functions) that are used to analyze observed propensities in experimental
systems, such as the likelihood of rolling double sixes with a set of
dice.3 1 In this mode, statistics is used to evaluate the results of multiple observations, such as calculating the mean concentration of a pollutant in a river from multiple test sites. Second, statistics is used to
make probability estimates for scientific inference, which are most
commonly associated with traditional methods for determining

sure interested political leaders that their support of statistics would not embarrass
them, the statist[icians] adopted the position that they were concerned exclusively
with facts." Id. at 35. Neither the logic nor theory of statistics, however, supported
statisticians' denials that statistical methods entailed substantive assumptions or values. Id.
30 Randall Collins, Statistics Versus Words, 2 Soc. THEORY 329, 331 (1984). As one
commentator has put it:
[A] 11principles of theory evaluation [i.e., experimental testing] make some
substantive assumptions about the structure of the world we live in and
about us as thinking, sentient beings. The difference between procedural
and substantive methodological rules is thus entirely a matter of degree and
of context. And as soon as we acknowledge that point, it becomes clear that
the cogency of any methodological principle is, at least in part, hostage to
the vicissitudes of our future interactions with the natural world. But that is
just another way of saying that methodologies and theories of knowledge are
precisely that, viz., theories.
LARRY LAUDAN, BEYOND POSITIviSM AND RELATIvISIM 171 (1996).
31 The simple roll of a fair die involves a stochastic system that is governed purely
by chance or random process. In complex real world settings, however, the concept
of chance often reflects both our state of knowledge and a characteristic of reality. See
JOHN EARMAN, BArfS OR BUST? 54 (1992). Chance can arise when we do not, and
perhaps cannot as a practical or epistemological matter, know the starting conditions
or sequence of actions that caused an event. If while hiking I am hit by a falling tree
branch, at least two independent chains of causation precipitated the event: the actions that led me to be hiking in the particular place at the time the branch fell and
the events that led to the collapse of the branch. In this example, two independent
causal chains (my decision to go hiking and the branch failure) converged to cause
the chance event. Importantly, the system of interactions in this example is not completely random; in fact, much predictive order exists, for example, in the tree
branch's failure, even if not all of the necessary information is available. If it were
possible to reconstruct each of these causal chains, one could fully explain the causes
of the event. Accordingly, chance is not limited to "the absence of causality," but
often incorporates our ignorance of causality based on what we choose, or are able, to
observe or test. Collins, supra note 30, at 332, 350.
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whether an experimental result is statistically significant. 32 In this second mode, statistical methods are used to determine whether or not
certain data support a particular scientific hypothesis, such as a theory
about the health risks from specific airborne pollutants; they do not
function as a direct summary of the trends observed in the data, as in
a median value or experimental uncertainty estimate.
As competing statistical theories, frequentist and Bayesian methods differ in several import respects. First, frequentist methods span
both the data summary and scientific inference modes, whereas Bayesian methods are limited to scientific inference. Second, while both
theories are derived from the same basic axioms, 33 they adopt divergent approaches to defining probability and deriving statistical inferences. Frequentists define probability objectively as the "long-run
frequencies" in a population.3 4 The frequency, for example, that samples from a body of water exceed a regulatory limit or the incidence
rate of a genetic defect in a population are representative of such
properties. 35 Bayesians, in contrast, define probability as the level of
confidence an individual has about an event or thing based on their
subjectivejudgment.36 Bayesian methods, for instance, could be used
to combine expertjudgments and observational data to determine the
"conditional probability" that air emissions from a power plant are
32 See IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 1, 11-16 (1975) (explaining
that probability is, on the one hand "statistical, concerning itself with stochastic laws
of chance processes," but on the other hand, "is epistemological, dedicated to assessing reasonable degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical
background").
33 HACKING, supra note 12, at 135. Three central axioms, often referred to as
Kolmogoroffs axioms, form the basic logical framework of all probability theory. The
framework is structured such that for an event E on a trial of kind K, the probability
of E,P(E), obeys the following axioms: (1) 0< P(E)< 1; (2) P(2) = 1, where f0 is a sure
outcome; and (3) P(EuF)= P(E) + P(F), where E and Fare mutually exclusive (i.e., do
not overlap)-this axiom generalizes as P(ZE) = YP(E) if each E,is mutually exclusive of the others. The expression P(EuF)is the probability of events E and F both
occurring. IAN HACKING, LOGIC OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 18-19 (1965). Acceptance
of these axioms is virtually universal and no attempt will be made to justify them here.
34 See HACKING, supra note 12, at 144-45, 190-91; HACKING, supra note 33, at 2.
35 In the first case, the body of water contains a specific concentration (i.e., longrun frequency) of the chemical. In the second case, a general population exists, all
humans, that has a (presumably) stable subpopulation with the genetic defect, and
the long-run frequency is the subpopulation's size divided by the total population's
size. A frequentist would take multiple samples of the water and study sample human
populations to obtain estimates of these long-run frequencies, and use these data as a
basis for statistical inference.

36

HACKING,

supra note 12, at 131-32, 140-44.
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harmful to human health.3 7 Third, frequentist probabilities do not
vary from person to person, whereas Bayesian probabilities may-even
if based on the same data. Scientists could, for example, derive very
different Bayesian estimates for the air pollution levels in a city using
the same monitoring data.
Bayesian and frequentist methods of statistical inference are
mathematically distinct in the following respect: the Bayesian "perspective fixes on one fundamental logical property of the probability
rules-Bayes's [theorem]. The frequency perspective fixes on another fundamental logical property of the probability rules-laws of
large numbers."38 In the former, Bayes's theorem operates as a logical algorithm for incorporating evidence into a probability estimate.3 9
For example, if you believe at the start of the season that your favorite
baseball team has a 30% chance of winning the World Series, Bayes's
theorem provides a logically consistent means of revising this estimate
during the course of the baseball season as your team's record evolves.
In the latter, the approximations made possible by the mathematical
law of large numbers are integral to the derivation of frequentist statistical testing methods and to their analytic power even when the available data are limited. 40 The central point to grasp here is that Bayesian

37 "Conditional probability" signifies that the probability estimate is conditioned
(i.e., based on or relative to) an initial judgment about the system being studied and

the available data. DAVID HOWIE, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY 30-31 (2002). Bayesians
focus on the data, not statistical samples of abstract populations. Bayesians begin with
a mathematical estimate of the statistical results, referred to as a "prior probability,"
and use observational data to refine the starting predictions and to quantify directly
the probability (e.g., 60%) of the violation occurring. Id.
38 See HACKING, supra note 12, at 190. The probability rules referred to here are
the basic axioms of probability theory, from which Bayes's theorem is derived directly,
and the law of large numbers refers to a critical mathematical simplification (valid for
large samples) that was instrumental in deriving the normal distribution.
39 As a number of legal academics have urged, Bayes's theorem could be used to
assistjuries in weighing and integrating the evidence in a case. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0.
FINKELSTEIN,

QUANTITATIVE

METHODS

IN LAW

87-98, 103-04, 289-310 (1978);

Tillers & F.D. Green eds.,
1988); David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: InstructingJurors on the Value of StatisticalEvidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16 (1988)
(asserting that "an expert's Bayesian formulation will not overwhelm the average trier
PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (P.

of fact," and courts should focus less on the potential of overwhelming the jury and

more on impressing the relevance of techniques). But see Ronald J. Allen & Brian
Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv. 1491, 1493
(2001) ("employ[ing] the naturalized epistemology approach to criticize existing theories of different evidentiary rules, including Bayesianism").
40 HACKING, supra note 12, at 190, 196-98.
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and frequentist methods are based on distinct mathematical theorems, which dictate how they are applied.
The two statistical theories also reflect opposing philosophies for
scientific inference: Bayesian methods are inductive while frequentist
methods are hypothetical-deductive. Take the example of assessing
the likelihood of global warming during the next decade. A Bayesian
would use Bayes's theorem to combine the available information, including the judgments of scientific experts, and derive inductively the
probability that global warming will occur (e.g., it is 60% likely). A
frequentist, in contrast, would start with a "null hypothesis" that global
warming will not occur and then conduct an experiment to test
whether this null hypothesis is consistent with the collected data. If
the experimental data are inconsistent with the null hypothesis, the
result is simply characterized as "statistically significant." Frequentist
methods consequently do not quantify directly the likelihood of
global warming; they function instead as a means for testing (i.e., falsifying) hypotheses. The more rigorous the statistical testing, the
greater the confidence a scientist using frequentist methods will have
in a hypothesis if it withstands such testing.
The historical development of statistics sheds further light on the
differences between the Bayesian and frequentist approaches and the
different roles statistical methods play in science. Statistics was used in
two distinct ways during its early development: (1) as a method for
combining experimental observations, and (2) as a means for drawing
scientific inferences. 4 1 The theoretical unification of these roles took
about 150 years and involved the work of some of the most brilliant
mathematicians of this period. 42 The discussion that follows begins by
describing work in the 1 7 00s and early 1800s on the statistical analysis
of experimental observations and then shifts to the late 1800s and
early 1900s to consider the work of Sir Ronald Fisher and Sir Harold
Jeffreys on statistical inference. Their views embody critical elements
of frequentism and Bayesianism, respectively, and reveal how these
distinctive traditions differ.
Astronomers working before the mid-1700s did not combine
measurements, except where precisely replicated measurements were
averaged together.43 At the time, the virtue of obtaining multiple
measurements under a range of conditions was completely misunderstood-scientists believed that combining observations would cause
41
42
43

M.

STEPHEN

TAINTY' BEFORE

STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF UNCER-

1900, at 4 (1986).

Id.
Id. at 30.
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errors to multiply, not cancel. 44 However by 1805, the Method of
Least Squares revealed that a data set's arithmetic mean represented
"the center around which the results of observations arrange themselves, so that the deviations from that center are as small as possible." 45 The center of gravity identified by the mean value of multiple

observations emboldened scientists to combine measurements, but
did not allow experimental error to be estimated. 46 Experimental error estimation had to wait for the derivation of the "normal distribution," or "bell-shaped curve," which scientists recognized as modeling
observations for which experimental errors are random. 47 Once this
connection was made, the normal distribution became the standard
mathematical model for calculating experimental error.48
Development of the normal distribution represented a turning
point in statistical theory. The archetype for a random, or stochastic,
system became a simple gas consisting of a large number of atoms
randomly interacting such that their individual velocities over time
are not causally connected. 49 The conditions of this simple atomic
model-independent elements identically distributed-also define
these terms.50 Two aspects of an atomistic model, and thus the normal distribution, are particularly distinctive and powerful. First, the
model provides a "zero point" against which to assess a system's order
because the elemental components of an atomistic model are assumed to be completely uncorrelated. 5 1 Scientists realized that this
property is crucial, as it can be exploited to assess causal relations in
44 Id. at 4.
45 Id. at 14-15.
46 Id. at 61, 139-40. Interestingly, some astronomers resisted statistical methods
for calculating errors on the basis that it preempted their expertise in judging their
own measurements. HoWIE, supra note 37, at 19.
47 STIGLER, supra note 41, at 141-45.
48 Id. at 157-58.
49 Collins, supra note 30, at 334-35. Randomness can also be defined more formally as (1) not being able to gamble a system; or (2) relative to an ideal computer,
any program sufficient to generate the sequence would be at least as long as the sequence. HACKING, supra note 12, at 145.
50 See HACKING, supra note 33, at 20-21; Collins, supra note 30, at 333-35. In this
context, "identically distributed" simply means that the velocities and magnitudes are
symmetric about the mean value for the system.
51 Causal connections between elements of a system exist along a continuum,
which ranges from full causal interdependence (e.g., carbon atoms in a diamond crystal) to complete causal independence (e.g., helium atoms in a balloon). Model frequency-type systems lie at the complete causal independence end of the scale, which
is, in effect, an "absolute zero" for causal relations within a system.
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experimental systems. 52 For example, if a scientist wishes to determine whether a chemical is harmful, she employs an atomistic model
of her experimental conditions as a baseline against which to assess
whether the chemical has a discernible effect. 53 Second, the model is

accurately represented by two simple parameters, making it exception54
ally easy to interpret.
The synthesis of combining experimental observations and evaluating experimental error established the basic mathematical foundation for modern statistics. Calculating the error associated with
observations, however, was just the start. Scientists soon realized that
the normal distribution could be used to model a broad range of
physical and social systems. 55 Social scientists were actually the first to
grasp the significance of these methods beyond their use in experimental error analysis. 56 At the time, statistical methods were employed to identify regularities in social statistics, culminating in the
57
use of the normal curve to construct an idealized "average man."

Economists also used the new methods to fulfill their aspirations for a
"social mechanics" comparable to Newtonian mechanics in physics. 58
Statistical theory enabled them to translate a physical atomistic model
into an economic theory in which utility became as fundamental to
economic theory as energy was to theoretical physics.
52 It is nevertheless essential to keep in mind that "a statistical model is not simply
a basis against which to test some other theory; it provides a model of the phenomena
itself." Collins, supra note 30, at 348.
53 A corollary principle necessary for this (frequentist) approach to be valid is
that only causally connected relations are observed over repeated observations, or in
large systems, because causally unconnected relations average out (i.e., cancel). See
PORTER, supra note 29, at 97.
54 HACKING, supra note 33, at 72-73 (noting that the two parameters are the
mean, or average value, and variance of the distribution).
55 Because scientists through much of the nineteenth century believed that the
physical world was deterministic, it was decades before physical science began to use
statistics for purposes other than error analysis. HOWIE, supra note 37, at 41-42, 200.
According to this perspective, determinism obviated the need for probabilistic models
because the natural sciences would generate precise descriptions of natural phenomena. Id.
56 See HoWIE, supra note 37, at 37; PORTER, supra note 29, at 111-13 (noting it was
ultimately the regularity of social statistics that inspired physical scientists to adopt
statistical methods).
57 See STIGLER, supra note 41, at 169-71, 201, 215, 221.
58 See PORTER, supra note 29, at 257. By reifying an atomistic model of society,
their approach abstracted frequentist theory by treating individual people atomistically, that is, as analogues of atoms in a simple gas system, and by defining utility as an
analogue of energy in this simple physical model. See id. at 256-57 (noting that Edgeworth referred to utility as the "invisible energy of pleasure"); see a/soJOHN M. KEYNES,

A

TREATISE ON PROBABILITY

249 (1921).
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The work of social scientists during the nineteenth century led to
more sophisticated techniques, such as statistical correlation and regression, that transformed the experimental methods of the social sciences and soon found their way back into the physical sciences. 59
These subsequent developments in statistics generalized the approach
taken in astronomy:
Observations and statistics agree in being quantities grouped about
a Mean; they differ, in that the Mean of observations is real, of statistics is fictitious. The mean of observations is a cause, as it were the
source from which diverging errors emanate. The mean of statistics
is a description, a representative quantity which, if we must in practice put one quantity for many, minimizes the error unavoidably attending such practice . . . . In short observations are different
cop'.es of one original; statistics are different originals affording one
"generic portrait."60
The median height among a collection of people and mean concentration of an airborne chemical are representative of a statistical
generic portrait or summary. The rising importance of statistical
methods also exposed important differences in how probability was
interpreted, precipitating the permanent division in statistics between
the frequentist and Bayesian schools. Fisher's andJeffreys's work and
advocacy enhanced the debate over the proper interpretation of
probability.
Ronald Fisher was instrumental in developing the formal methods for frequentist statistical inference and experimental design. According to Fisher, "science was a matter of random statistical
aggregates, and the data representative of a population."' 6 1 Fisher's
view of science was deeply informed by his work in Mendelian genetics, which scientists have aptly characterized as nature's "perfect gambling machine." 62 Population genetics became the central metaphor
of Fisher's work: Just as a human population contains many genetic
subpopulations, so too is the universe made up of innumerable populations or classes of things, which experiments randomly "sample" to

59 See STIGLER, supra note 41, at 358-61.
60 Id. at 309.
61 HOWIE, supra note 37, at 164.
62 Id. at 61 ("Mendelism was unique in involving a chance mechanism that generated with exact and fixed probability one of a set of clearly-defined outcomes. Genetic probabilities could thus be treated as inherent to the world rather than reflecting
incomplete knowledge.") (citing G.A. Barnard, Reply to S.L. Zakell, 4 STAT. Sci. 258,

259-60 (1989)).
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determine their properties. 63 For Fisher, statistical inference involved
obtaining a statistical sample of a population, such as sediment sampling points in a river, from which the fixed (i.e., objective) frequencies of the population were inferred. 64 Fisher's test for statistical
significance provides a measure of the fidelity between an experimental sample statistic, such as a mean sediment contaminant level, and
the corresponding parameter in the real world population, here the
mean sediment contaminant level of every point in the river. 65 The
great strength of Fisher's work was that his statistical tests were both
simple to apply and valid for even relatively small experimental
samples.
Harold Jeffreys was a physicist with an astonishing talent for developing mathematically tractable models for complex systems in geophysics, meteorology, and astrophysics. 66 As in astronomy, Jeffreys's
work was observational, not experimental (i.e., not based on carefully
controlled and replicated studies), "and the relevant data [were]
often scarce and of variable quality. '67 These constraints led Jeffreys
to integrate observations from diverse fields. "His inferences often
tied geological and archeological results to astronomical observations
and even considerations from atomic physics or the classical theory of
waves. A frequency interpretation was simply unavailable: such data
could not be regarded as from a specified [frequentist] population." 68
As a result, Jeffreys viewed probability as a characteristic of imperfect knowledge and thus relative to the available information. 69 The
nature ofJeffreys's scientific work also made it natural for him to integrate his scientific judgments with empirical observations. For Jeffreys, Bayesian analysis provided the formal theoretical framework to
63 Id. at 63. Under this theory, the statistical frequencies measured in an experiment do not represent the "credibility" of the result; they are the relative frequencies
of the sample. Id.
64 Id. at 70, 74. Determining, for example, the average frequency, on a daily
basis, of rain in a specific region draws a sample from an essentially infinite population consisting of days. Fisher's work was particularly remarkable insofar as it allowed

scientists to infer general laws based on relatively small sample sizes. See id. at 71.
65 Id. at 63. Just as one would predict intuitively, the larger the sample size and
better controlled the experiment, the better the sample statistic will approximate the
parameter in the population being tested. Id. at 71.
66 See id. at 5, 82, 84.
67 Id. at 113.
68 Id. at 169.
69 See id. at 4, 8, 89. One ofJeffreys's seminal discoveries was that the Earth's core
is molten. In this context, it made no sense to determine the long-run probability

that this was true. Either it was or it was not molten-positing a hypothetical population of Earths from which to draw samples would have been absurd. Id at 8.
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combine his scientific judgments with the available observational data
to make scientific inferences.
The differences in Fisher's andJeffreys's approaches demonstrate
70
the close connection between substantive science and statistics.
Fisher began with a probabilistic, or stochastic, model of the universe
analogized from Mendelian population genetics. He deduced from
this model an objectivist approach to statistical inference based on
rigorous testing protocols, under which confidence in a hypothesis is
strengthened if it passes such tests. 7 1 Jeffreys's experience as a physi-

cist, in contrast, led him to Bayesian analysis, which provided a logically coherent means of combining expert judgment and diverse
empirical observations to derive conditional probability estimates for
his physical theories. 72 The two approaches treat new information
very differently. For Fisher, new data reduce statistical error rates by
providing a larger sample that is more representative of the true population, and thus a stronger test for statistical significance. For Jeffreys, new information does not reduce statistical error rates, it
alters-either up or down-one's degree of belief (i.e., the
probability) that a hypothesis is true.
The work of Fisher and Jeffreys reveals how the frequentist and
Bayesian approaches to probability are premised on two distinct conceptual foundations. Frequentism adopts a world view in which abstract populations are the building blocks of the universe. Under this
framework, experimental science is simply a process of obtaining "random samples from a population of fixed distribution," much as one
might take multiple samples of a gumball machine to estimate the
relative abundance of the different flavors it contains. 73 As Fisher's
work suggests, this model of reality was generalized from his experimental work in Mendelian genetics, not proven.7 4 Bayesians reject
Fisher's unproven presumption that the world is divided into abstract
populations and opt instead for the logical coherence grounded in
70 The work of Fisher and Jeffreys also illustrates just how much "[e]ach interpretation of probability... [is] suited to a particular sort of [scientific] inquiry." Id. at 9.
71 Because Jeffreys viewed "populations" as "unobserved data," he rejected
Fisher's form of statistical inference because it enabled "a hypothesis that may be true
[to] be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occured." Id. at 155 (quoting H. JEFFREYS, THEORY OF PROBABILITY 357 (2d ed. 1948)).
72 Jeffreys's Bayesian approach was pointedly criticized for creating a "wretched
hybrid" of objective frequencies and subjective judgment (i.e., data, experience, and
psychological factors) when what scientists wanted to compare were mathematical
models to objective data-in short, experimental observations must be separated
from scientific judgment. See id. at 161-62.
73 Id. at 37.
74 See id. at 107.
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Bayes's theorem. Bayesians are not, however, able to avoid this metaphysical uncertainty, as it re-enters their analysis in the form of the
scientific judgments on which Bayesian analyses are based. These
points are crucial to appreciating the relationship between probability
and judgment in the two theories. Probability and scientific judgment
are distinct for frequentists because they treat probability as an objective property that is used to justify scientific judgments. Probability
and scientific judgment are merged for Bayesians because they treat
probability as a subjective property that incorporates subjective judgments directly into probability estimates. The two theories consequently incorporate scientific judgments in very different ways.
II.

SCIENTIFIC JUDGMENT AND QUANTIFICATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Environmentalists object to statistical methods for two central
reasons. First, statistical variables distort environmental policies by su-

perimposing overly simplistic generic portraits of complex
problems. 75 To give just one example, environmental risks of industrial chemicals are often reduced to assessments of human carcinogenicity, without any consideration of harms to wildlife, ecosystems, or
non-cancer human health risks.76 This type of distortion arises inexorably from statistical quantification, which in all but the most trivial
systems sacrifices representation accuracy for analytic clarity and tractability. 7 7 Second, traditional frequentist methods of statistical infer75 See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HAlv. L. REV. 1329, 1372-76 (1971) [hereinafter Tribe, Trial by Mathematics];
Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor Environ-

mental Law, 83 YALE LJ. 1315, 1329-32 (1974) [hereinafter Tribe, Plastic Trees].
76 Critics also charge that simplifying assumptions, such as functional linearity
and continuity, are more misleading than enlightening and therefore should be critically re-evaluated.

See Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PHIL. &

66, 73-74, 87-88, 92-93 (1972); Tribe, Plastic Trees, supra note 75, at
1331-32. A great deal of attention also has been directed at the values implicit in
various simplifying assumptions in cost-benefit analysis, such as the use of economic
discounting and risk metrics in environmental policy. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa
PUB. AFF.

Heinzerling, Pricingthe Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1553, 1578-81 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2060-64 (1998); Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5,

at 1616.
77 In addition to determining what factors a statistic should reflect (e.g., all risks
or some set of well known risks), scientists must determine (1) the level at which
information will be aggregated and (2) the scale used to quantify the data. The first
question raises an interpretive problem, namely, that "statistical uniformity [may be]
mostly superficial, attained only when one considers a great mass and smears together
the variety of the phenomena." PORTER, supra note 29, at 183-84. A globally aver-

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL-

79:2

ence are biased because they implicitly place the scientific burden of
proof on those seeking to demonstrate risks to the environment or
human health. Although these objections are distinct, statistical inference is dependent on quantification as a precondition for its application. Methods of quantification (e.g., scaling or variable type) and
any underlying scientific theories frame all statistical analyses, making
statistical inference dependent on these methodological and theoreticaljudgments. This Part focuses on the uncertainties inherent in, and
approaches to, developing quantitative measures for statistical
analyses.
Environmental policy is riven by disputes between environmentalists and regulatory opponents over the use of quantitative methodsalthough, neither is consistent in their critique. 78 For example, environmental risks are typically formulated by critics of regulation as objective properties that can be readily aggregated for an entire
population, just as economists aggregate individual utilities. In opposition, environmentalists argue that such overly reductive approaches
to risk distort reality by disregarding localized conditions, such as isolated areas of high risk that disproportionately affect certain communities, and by excluding important values commonly overlooked in
risk models. 79 Yet, many simplifying assumptions also are made in araged temperature, for example, actually obscures regional variability and limits the
range of causal relations that can be resolved. Statistical uniformity in such cases is an
artifact of the system's size, and is thus not accurately representative of the quantity
being analyzed. Id. at 184-85. Statistical scaling is determined either by the observation technique or by the nature of the hypothesis, such that some statistics fall into
strict categories while others extend along a continuum. For example, survival or
death from lead exposure is categorical (an individual is either dead or alive, not
somewhere in between) whereas cognitive losses from lead exposure occur along a
continuum ranging from extreme to nominal impairment. In this simple example, a
scientist would therefore use different statistical scales depending on whether she was
concerned about mortality or cognitive harm to children.
78 Justice Stephen Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious Circle, illustrates this point
perfectly. In chapter one, he bases his analysis on a great deal of cost-benefit data,
which he largely takes as uncontested; in chapter two, he describes in detail the
problems and limitations of existing risk assessment methods, which he describes as
highly uncertain and subject to numerous simplifying assumptions. BREYER, supra
note 20, at 3-51. However, as professor Lisa Heinzerling has argued persuasively, the
cost-benefit methods Breyer relies on in his first chapter are equally susceptible to the
sorts of uncertainties and simplifying assumptions Breyer takes pains to elucidate in
the second chapter of his book. Heinzerling, supra note 76, at 2064-69.
79 See supra note 76. Risk models, for example, assume that risk varies continuously and linearly, such that a marginal increase in a low-level risk is treated as
equivalent to a marginal increase in a high-level risk. For some people, risks above a
certain level will be intolerable and they would not weigh marginal increases in risk
above this level equally with risks below it. This is analogous to, though the inverse of,
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eas of environmental science that environmentalists use to justify regulatory programs.8 0 Climate change models, for example, ignore
localized conditions to enable statistical data to be interpretable and
predictions to be made.8 1 Each side of the debate thus has its favored
areas of science where quantification, despite numerous simplifying
assumptions, remains relatively uncontested, as well as its favorite examples of "pseudo-science" permeated by "trans-scientific" judgments
(i.e., technical questions that cannot be fully resolved by science)82
Predictably, the line between presumptively legitimate methods and
so-called junk science is drawn such that the interests of the particular
advocate are supported by good science.
Science and trans-science cannot be distinguished based on the
presence or absence of qualitative judgments-at most, this is a question of degree rather than kind. Indeed, if science were defined by
such analytical purity, virtually nothing could be characterized as scientific. As discussed below, philosophers such as Sir Karl Popper exposed the fallacy that science can be reduced to either logically
inductive or deductive methods.8 3 Yet, conservative proponents of the
natural sciences frequently describe them in a purely positivist mode
economists' claims that the marginal value of money diminishes with a person's
wealth.
80 Environmental assessments use broad based indices, such as global carrying
capacity and growth limits, that are subject to numerous judgments and uncertainties.
Moreover, some of the most celebrated environmental books have used quantitative
estimates to dramatize the impacts of population growth and the limits of environmental sustainability. See, e.g., PAUL R. ERHLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (rev. ed.
1978) (documenting the tensions between population growth and environmental unsustainability); DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., BEYOND THE LIMITS (1992) (updating the
Limits to Growth analysis and making an effort to describe a sustainable future);
DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972) (using a systems based
approach to model human impacts on the global environment and to assess the limits
of human and economic growth); see also WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, LIVING PLANET REPORT (2002), availableat http://www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/livingplanet2002.pdf
(giving a contemporary analysis of global impacts using a variety of quantitative
indices).
81
See supra note 77.

82

See

KENNETH

R.

FOSTER & PETER

W.

HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE

55-58 (1997)

("[Trans-science] concerns questions that are scientific in Popper's sense but are not

resolvable in practice."); Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1619
nn.21-22. The term "trans-science" was first coined by the physicist Alvin Weinberg
to mean "questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by
science." Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972).
83 See infra Part II.B; RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 152-53 (1992); Naomi Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Confirmation
of NumericalModels in the Earth Sciences, 263 SCIENCE 641, 642 (1994); Weinberg, supra

note 82, at 209.
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that portrays science as purely a matter of logic. 84 Similarly, it is this

mechanical picture of science that many environmentalists critical of
quantitative methods have in mind when they challenge the purported bias of scientific findings. 85 Both perspectives are misleading.
Selectively rejecting scientific methods based on a positivist caricature
of science is a strawman tactic used by regulatory critics to discredit
certain types of science, and by environmentalists to bind scientific
experts to a rigid model of science. All areas of science necessarily
draw on a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods, making scientific positivism little more than a malleable fiction that is wielded
effectively in an offensive mode but has little constructive value.
At the other extreme, the relativists' claim that science is suffused
by subjective judgments that negate the separation of scientific facts
and values is equally problematic. 8 6 This perspective ignores important low-level methodological strategies, such as using independent
and diverse experimental methods to test scientific hypotheses, that
prevent or limit the intrusion of values into science. A bipolar debate
over the proper role of science in environmental policy therefore
misses a great deal of what gives science its normative authority. Too
few people in the legal community adequately appreciate that much
useful science falls between the positivist and relativist poles. The sections that follow describe typical approaches to scientific uncertainty
and quantification within environmental law, present the formal philosophical arguments on which these approaches are based, and identify a middle ground for understanding how quantitative methods
evolve and succeed in the face of broader theoretical uncertainties.
In this light, scientific authority derives from its prospective power to
84
ERS

See, e.g.,

SHEILA JASANoFF, THE FIFrH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAK-

1 (1990) (describing how commentators perceive science advisors as "critical in-

telligence" in a regulatory system that is otherwise too vulnerable to politics);
Graham, supra note 4, at 41-42 (describing sound science as "objective, weight-of-theevidence evaluation that is peer reviewed"); Dorothy Nelkin, The Political Impact of
Technical Expertise, 5 Soc. STUD. Sci. 35, 36 (1975) (describing the idealized role of
technical expertise in policymaking). This "scientist" perspective dates back to the
Theodore Roosevelt conservation era, which was based on using trained impartial

experts, drawing on objective scientific facts, to make resource management decisions. SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at 2-3 (1959).
85 See, e.g., PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT 71 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999) (articulating a simple positivist view of science).
86 As one critic has put it, the relativist "move from the alleged failure of [a sampling of] methodological rules to the presumption that all methodologies are hopeless is to engage in just the sort of naive inductivism about which [they are] otherwise
so abusive." LAUDAN, supra note 30, at 104.
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generate accepted truths, as opposed to some claim to analytical determinacy, and treating science in purely relativist terms (i.e., it is all
political) threatens the potential growth and success of environmental
science.
A.

The Debate Within the Legal Community over Quantification

The rhetorical power and limitations inherent in statistical methods of quantification clearly warrant the legal community's attention. 8 7 The basic problem, according to environmentalists, is that the
process of identifying and naming categories can in fact never be
wholly neutral (e.g., defining risk solely in terms of human cancer
88
deaths), as all facts embody certain substantive beliefs and values.
The mixing of facts and values negates the neutrality of science because simplifying assumptions employed to construct quantitative
measures obscure certain "perspectives and possibilities," such as hotly
contested environmental values like protecting endangered species or
pristine wilderness. 8 9 Further, this blending of science and policy inexorably leads scientists to inject their own ideological predilections
into their analysis (e.g., industry scientists make self-serving assump87 These distortions are perhaps more potent than one might initially assume
when applied in a legal or policy setting: The use of statistical methods, for example
in risk assessment, is necessarily based on a host of simplifying assumptions that
amount to a highly simplified and ultimately inaccurate version of reality. Nevertheless, because of the perceived solidity and utility of a numerical formulation, we conflate this caricature with conditions in the real world, disregarding the acknowledged
limitations of the theory employed. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 291 (1987). Thus, once a policymaker has risk estimates before her, they are
treated as gospel in the absence of competing estimates or a sophisticated understanding of the underlying methods. In so doing, policymakers transform a highly
simplified theory, or hypothesis, about the world into a method of obtaining information that is descriptive of it; theory seamlessly becomes an established method for
observing facts.
88 See Tribe, supra note 76, at 75-77.
89 See id.; Ackerman & Heinzerling, supranote 76, at 1578-81; Heinzerling, supra
note 76, at 2060-64; Tribe, Plastic Trees, supranote 75, at 1319. A common example is
the so-called "dwarfing of soft variables," which occurs when unquantified factors (soft
variables) are discounted, or ignored, relative to quantified factors in an analysis. See
Heinzerling, supra note 76, at 2060-61; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, supra note 75, at
1361-65. If, for instance, an agency quantifies certain risks associated with a proposal,
such as human health risks from cancer, but neglects others, such as ecological impacts, the quantified risks will be given disproportionate weight in setting policy. For
some of these commentators, the cryptic nature of quantitative methods aggravates
these deficiencies because "numbers disguise the numbers' true meaning and inhibit
useful and informed discussion about the matters in question." Heinzerling, supra
note 76, at 2042.
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tions that chemicals are harmless at very low exposure levels).90 Similar to the legal debates over formalist approaches to judicial review,
the objectivity of science is challenged because of such individual biases or decisionmakers' interest in cloaking questions of policy in
technical jargon. 9 1
The favored example of policy masquerading as science in environmental law is chemical risk assessment. In her article, The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, Professor Wendy Wagner identifies
many so-called trans-scientific judgments made when interpreting the
results of animal studies for purposes of determining a chemical's
toxicity: 9 2
Extrapolating [the high-dose] results to potential effects of low
levels of the substance on humans then presents the next two transscientific junctures, which are often collapsed into one. First ...an
extrapolatory model must be selected that will predict low-dose effects on animals based solely on high-dose data. Although there are
several scientifically plausible extrapolatory models... the choice of
one model over another cannot be resolved by science and thus
must be determined by policy factors. This policy choice will have
significant implications for the level ultimately chosen as adequate
to protect public health. Second ... since the similarities between

animals and humans with regard to their sensitivity to carcinogens
90 See Tribe, Plastic Trees, supra note 75, at 1332. Many industry scientists, for
example, subscribe to the view that toxic chemicals often have a threshold below
which they have no effect. Most environmentalists reject this theory as unproven and
likely unprovable given existing methods. Both sides of this debate arguably make
judgments about the underlying science that are informed by their individual
prejudices and interests.
91 See generally BREYER, supra note 20, at 47-49 (explaining that scientists from
government regulatory agencies can frame uncertain scientific evidence to fit political
agendas); Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1628-31 (describing how
government agency scientists fill "trans-scientific gaps" in the standard setting process
by making policy choices and by failing to reveal those choices). The same kinds of
allegations have been made regarding the role of judges in reviewing statutes or the
Constitution:
It's because everybody down deep knows [that judges can get away with inserting their own value judgments into opinions] that few come right out
and argue for the judge's own values as a source of constitutional judgment.
Instead the search purports to be objective and value-neutral; the reference
is to something "out there" waiting to be discovered, whether it be natural
law or some supposed value consensus of historical America, today's
America, or the America that is yet to be.
ELY, supra note 14, at 48.
92 Wagner defines trans-science broadly to include "significant splits in the scientific community that are identified by scientists as major controversies over 'scientific
judgment."' Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1620 n.22.
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are largely unknown and incapable of being studied directly, a pol93
icy choice must again be made.
Justice Stephen Breyer makes many similar observations, although from a different perspective, in his book, Breaking the Vicious
Circle.
The more frequently used animal studies are often more uncertain
[than human studies]. The investigator applies a high dose of a
supposed carcinogen to the animals; if they develop a higher than
average number of tumors, the analyst tries to extrapolate backward
to low doses in humans. What assumptions shall be made in doing
so? What extrapolation model should be used? Risk analysts tend
to use, for both animal and epidemiological studies, a linear model,
which extrapolates backward on a straight line.... Critics argue that
to use such mathematical models is like saying "If ten thousand men
will drown in ten thousand feet of water, then one man will drown
in one foot of water," or "If dropping ten bottles off a ten-foot wall
breaks all ten, then dropping ten bottles off a one-foot wall will
break one."

94

Both authors raise compelling points about the intermixing of
science and policy. 95 Yet, they come to different conclusions about
the problems with federal policymaking. Breyer considers the "disciplinary canon" to be often far too weighted towards "erring on the
safe side,"9 6 whereas Wagner claims that trends in chemical regulation
reveal that the system is biased against less studied chemicals and
97
often neglects chemicals posing greater potential risks.
Despite their mutual concern about administrative efficiency and
scientific accuracy, Breyer and Wagner propose conflicting solutions
for ensuring that regulatory decisionmaking is effective when the
available science is indeterminate. 98 Consistent with his faith in scientific expertise, Breyer recommends establishing a distinct civil service
career path in health and environmental policy and calls for the "crea93 Id. at 1626.
94 BREYER, supra note 20, at 44 (citations omitted). The critics Breyer refers to
are extrapolating linearly down to zero.
95 I question whether the analogies Breyer offers at the end of the excerpt are
appropriate. Evidence exists that certain chemicals, even at very low concentrations,
are toxic, whereas the two examples Breyer provides are designed to be absurd because we apparently have no reason to fear any harm at the lower magnitudes.

96

BREYER,

supra note 20, at 43.

97 Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1682-84 (objecting to the EPA's
focus on human epidemiological data to the exclusion of other studies based on
animal data or in vitro studies).
98 BREYER, supra note 20, at 48-51, 55-56; Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra
note 5, at 1673-74, 1677-88.
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tion of a small, centralized administrative group, charged with a rationalizing mission," which would have prestige, independence, and
substantial authority. 9 9 Wagner is more focused on political accountability and process, which leads her to propose procedural amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act.10 0 Wagner's reforms have
two elements: First, the amendments would "expressly require the
agencies to separate science from policy and task the courts with the
responsibility for ensuring that the agency does so in an accurate and
accessible way;" second, if an agency passes this first test, a reviewing
"court should accord the content of the policy and science decisions
great deference." 10 ' In short, Wagner relies on a different group of
experts-judges-to provide a procedural check on scientific experts
engaged in environmental policymaking.
Both proposals have serious drawbacks. Much of the case for
Breyer's proposal turns on the political isolation and objectivity of the
elite administrative group he recommends. Even setting aside concerns about political accountability, 10 2 insulating such a group from
politics seems wildly unlikely. One need only consider the political
storms surrounding nominations of federal judges, who may be politically insulated once appointed but must first traverse a political
minefield. 10 3 Given the broad authority Breyer intends to delegate to
this elite group, it is virtually inconceivable that a similar vetting process would not arise. Federal scientific advisory boards offer another
point of comparison. 10 4 Despite their (generally) low profile, highly
technical orientation, and limited tenures, scientific advisory boards
have not been immune to politicization-especially where environmental issues are concerned. In 1983, for example, the Reagan Administration was known to have had a "hit list" for "green" scientists
99 BREYER, supra note 20, at 59-61.
100 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
101 Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1711-12 (footnote omitted); see
also McGarity, supra note 5, at 746-47 (describing a proposal that shares many similarities with Wagner's).
102 Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1674-77.
103 See Stephen Murdoch, The Politics of Judicial Confirmation, WASH. LAW., Sept.
2002, at 22.
104 See, e.g.,JASANOFF, supra note 84, at 1-2 (describing scientific advisory committees as "offer[ing] a flexible, low cost, means for government officals to consult with
knowledgeable and up-to-date practitioners in relevant scientific and technical
fields"); BRUCE L.R. SMITH, THE ADVISERS: SCIENTISTS IN THE POLICY PROCESS 1 (1992)

(noting the existence of about 1000 different committees and dividing them into four
categories: peer review panels, program advisory committees, ad hoc factfinding or
investigating committees, and standing committees).
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° More recently,
on the EPA's Scientific Advisory Board.105
the current
Bush Administration has been accused by prominent members of the
scientific community of creating "an epidemic of politics" in its appointments to scientific advisory boards.1 0 6 These realities make political insulation chimerical where powerful interests are affected, and
they seriously undermine Breyer's approach.
Wagner all but concedes the major flaw in her proposal toward
the end of her article: "Although the capability of the judiciary to review science-policy delineations is the limiting factor to success of the
reform, it is conceivable that this obstacle can be overcome. 10 7 Wagner acknowledges this difficulty earlier, concluding that "distinguishing between questions resolvable by science and those that must
remain trans-scientific requires familiarity with the current capabilities
and limitations of scientific experimentation."' 0 8 I am far less sanguine than Wagner about relying on judicial review. First, scientific
literacy is only a necessary condition; it provides no assurance that the
courts' procedural distinctions, which also are vulnerable to value
judgments, will not be shot through with political considerations. Second, an analogue of her proposal exists in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' 0 9 and suggests further obstacles. Like
Wagner's amendments, NEPA is designed to promote better informed
decisions by federal agencies and to enhance public participation.1 10
Moreover, while NEPA's regulations do not precisely contemplate
Wagner's distinction, their mandate that the incompleteness or un-

105 JASANOFF, supra note 84, at 89.
106 The Bush Administration has been accused of "stacking" several high-profile
committees, most notably the CDC's Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning and the FDA's Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee. See Ceci Connolly, Hill Group Faults HHSfor Ideology, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2002, at A25; Maureen
Dowd, Editorial, Tribulation Worketh Patience, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at A27; Dan
Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel,297 SCIENCE 1456 (2002); Ellen Goodman, Editorial, Religious Profiling?, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2002, at A23; Donald Kennedy, An Epidemic of Politics, 299 SCIENCE 625 (2003); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush's
Science Advisers Drawing Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at A27; Rick Weiss, HHS
Seeks Science Advice to Match Bush Views, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at Al. This is also a
political issue, with several Democrats now objecting to the Administration's practices.
See David Malakoff, Democrats Accuse Bush of Letting Politics Distort Science, 301 SCIENCE
901 (2003).
107 Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1719.
108 Id. at 1627.
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(0 (2000).
110 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332; see also
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1, 1501.2 (2002). Implementing regulations for NEPA stress the
importance of effectively communicating with the public and addressing directly
questions regarding "incomplete or unavailable information." Id. § 1502.22.
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availability of information be disclosed is very similar.'
Experience
with NEPA is not promising with regard to either streamlining the
regulatory process or improving transparency: NEPA is the preeminent statute for delaying agency action, and the environmental impact
statements that NEPA mandates are notoriously arcane.1 12 The same
complex science, politics, and bureaucratic tendencies are likely to
overwhelm Wagner's reforms as well.
Breyer and Wagner both make sweeping generalizations from the
uncertainties of risk assessment methods without considering science
more broadly.1 13 This narrow scope weakens their arguments and is
compounded by their apparently static view of environmental science. 114 Fixating on trans-science also causes them to ignore that science is itself a process and to blithely reject the potential for science
to progress.1 15 Breyer and Wagner both fall into this trap by failing to
address the tradeoffs that exist between maintaining scientific integrity and safeguarding democratic principles, and this oversight undermines the merits of both their arguments in the process. Part II.B.
discusses the origins of scientific uncertainty and theories of scientific
progress in order to clarify the problems Breyer and Wagner raise and
to explain how scientific judgment is used in environmental science.
111 Council on Environmental Quality Environmental Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.22. This section requires a statement to be included in an environmental impact statement regarding all incomplete or unavailable "information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant impacts." Id.
112 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.1, at 817-18 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing an "avalanche of litigation" and injunctions); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Governments'EnvironmentalPerformance,

102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915-16 (2002) (noting the highly technical nature of environmental impact statements); William C. Sullivan et al., Assessing the Impact of EnvironmentalImpact Statements on Citizens, 16 ENVrL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 171, 174-75,
177-79 (1996) (observing that citizens generally do not comprehend the information
presented in a typical environmental impact statement).
113 Breyer claims the example of "cancer-causing substances" has "illustrative
power," but nowhere seeks to substantiate this claim. BREYER, supra note 20, at 3.
114 In fact, trans-science is frequently defined as immune to scientific investigation. See McGarity, supra note 5, at 733-34 ("[B]y definition, scientific experimentation is incapable of resolving trans-scientific issues."); see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra
note 82, at 55 ("[Trans-science] concerns questions that are scientific in Popper's
sense but are not resolvable in practice.").
115 The concept of trans-science is further complicated by environmentalists'
claims that scientific facts and values cannot be separated. Yet, if science, as opposed
to trans-science, is to have any content, it seems to demand that science be capable of
establishing facts that are independent of valuejudgments. Reliance on the science/
trans-science distinction therefore seems to require qualification of the fact-value argument environmentalists often make.
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Part II.C. presents a methodologically grounded view of science that
offers a different account of how quantitative methods succeed.
B.

The Problem of Underdeterminationin Science

Breyer and Wagner focus on a single instance of a much broader
question-how to obtain reliable scientific information and theories.
The aim of this discussion is to demonstrate that no single scientific
theory (or statistical technique) is adequate to the task; all are distorting insofar as they utilize an imperfect framework for evaluating
scientific problems. This incompleteness, however, should not be
construed to imply that science is hopelessly indeterminate; to the
contrary, methodological strategies exist that overcome these shortcomings. The discussion that follows briefly examines the treatment
of scientific uncertainty by Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. As already
noted in the Introduction, the discussion will draw on arguments
made regarding judicial review to ground the scientific theory in familiar legal territory.
Classical positivists or empiricists, such as Francis Bacon, portrayed science as consisting purely of gathering positive facts from
which scientific theories are mechanically inferred. 116 They believed
that knowledge is obtained passively, through nature imprinting itself
on inert minds, and that scientific uncertainty is simply an absence of
facts."x 7 This passive model was challenged by the interpretive Kantian school, which asserted that all experience and understanding are
actively mediated through an innate conceptual framework. In the
last century, the work of Karl Popper incorporated the Kantian activist
model. 118 Popper believed that reliable scientific inference is best
achieved through a combination of imaginative hypothesis testing and
a rigorous war of attrition, or falsification, based on hard-headed critical analysis. 119
Popper's work has been immensely influential in science and
law.120 A central tenet of Popper's work is that scientific inference is
116

See ALAN

48-54 (1993);
17-18 (1991).
117 Imre Lakatos, Falsificationand the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in
CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 104 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave
eds., 1970).
118 KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 93-96, 190-91, 383-84
(1963).
119 Id. at 26-30.
120 Popper, in particular, was favorably cited by the Supreme Court in the seminal
1993 Daubert opinion. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
593 (1993). Popper and Carl Hempel were the only two philosophers cited by the
MUSGRAVE, COMMON SENSE, SCIENCE AND SCEPTICISM

DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
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never purely instrumental-facts and theories combine to alter an individual's conceptual framework, as opposed to merely augmenting
their breadth of knowledge. 12 1 Popper's position is analogous to the
commonplace view that ajudge's perspective is necessarily influenced
by her experience (facts), which, in turn, will affect the principles
(theories) she considers when interpreting a given constitutional provision (fact). Moreover, because theories are inextricably linked to
facts, theories may operate in an observational mode to generate facts
for hypothesis testing (e.g., theories about how compounds absorb
light are used in experiments designed to test theories about atmospheric pollution) or may be the subject of hypothesis testing
themselves.
Popper began with two central arguments: (1) "all theories are
not only equally unprovable but also equally improbable," 122 and (2)
"no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced."' 2 3 This latter argument is critically important because it necessitates the rejection of naive logical positivism, which is premised on the possibility of
falsifying, as opposed to verifying, scientific theories. According to
Popper, those who wait for conclusive disproof before eliminating a
theory will have to wait forever, and "will never benefit from experience."'1 24 Naive logical positivism therefore fails for the same reason
that classical empiricism does, namely, all factual observations are
Supreme Court. Id. According to the Court, "[s]cientific methodology today is based
on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this
methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry." Id.
(quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV.

643, 645 (1992)). The Supreme Court then went on to quote Popper directly: "[T]he
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability." Id. (quoting POPPER, supra note 118, at 37).
121 POPPER, supra note 118, at 108-14; KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERY 37-38, 59 n.1 (1959).

122 Lakatos, supra note 117, at 95; see also POPPER, supra note 121, at 27-30,
254-62. The argument goes as follows: First, if theories cannot be proven by facts, but
only falsified, then all theories are fallible. Second, if all facts are constructed from
fallible theories, then all facts themselves are also fallible. Third, if all facts used to
negate theories are fallible, then the experimental negation of any theory is itself also
fallible. This series of syllogisms may be summed up as follows: "Scientific theories
are not only equally unprovable, and equally improbable, they are also equally undisprovable." Lakatos, supra note 117, at 103. Moreover, theories become more resistant
to empirical challenges as they mature. Id. at 101-02.
123 POPPER, supra note 121, at 50, 80-81 (emphasis added); see also POPPER, supra
note 118, at 278-79 (noting that "actual tests are never conclusive and always
tentative").
124 POPPER, supra note 121, at 50.

2004]

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM

AND

RESTRAINT

"theory impregnated" and thus do not exist outside a theoretical
framework.1 2 5 Scientists, for example, cannot conduct an unmediated
measurement of a chemical's toxicity because theories about exposure
levels and pathways, animal models, and experimental controls are required to make sense of the data and to direct how an experiment is
conducted. Accordingly, just as judges often must appeal to substantive principles to interpret a constitutional provision, so too must
scientists use substantive theories to resolve the meaning of their data;
both are theory-impregnated in this sense.
Popper's second argument can be restated as follows: no single
theory "forbid[s] any observable state of affairs."' 26 An example will
help to illustrate this point. Assume that an astronomer has observed
a planet revolving around a distant star and is able to map the planet's
orbit based on her observations. 127 Assume further that the observed
orbit deviates significantly from the orbit one would expect to find by
performing classical (i.e., Newtonian) calculations. Does this deviation lead the astronomer to reject Newton's theory? No. The astronomer will instead construct a hypothesis (e.g., an unknown second
planet is altering the first planet's orbit) to explain the orbital deviation and then conduct further experiments to test the validity of this
secondary hypothesis. Popper argued that a chain of such observations followed by "correcting" or "auxiliary" hypotheses could be constructed to explain away any deviant result, and that this process could
go on indefinitely. 128 Any collection of facts is therefore going to be
theoretically underdetermined because it can be accounted for by numerous competing theories.
Underdetermination creates a fundamental dilemma: If theories
can neither be proved nor disproved conclusively, on what grounds
may scientists adopt any given scientific theory? Popper attempted to
resolve this problem by recourse to a "survival-of-the-fittest" model for
science, under which hypothesis selection occurs through a process of
falsifying theories against each other rather than against isolated
facts. 129 For each test, one theory is employed as the (tentatively) accepted "background knowledge" that supplies the facts employed to
125 POPPER, supra note 118, at 188-89. Some theorists claim that logical positivism
"is at this stage dead." Interview by Werner Callebaut with Philip Kitcher, Professor of
Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, in San Diego, Cal. (June 1, 1990),
in TAKING THE NATURALISTIC TuRN,OR How REAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IS DONE 128
(Werner Callebaut ed., 1993).
126 Lakatos, supra note 117, at 100-01, 116.
127 Id. at 100-01.
128 Id. at 100-01; POPPER, supra note 121, at 82-83.
129 POPPER, supra note 118, at 52; POPPER, supra note 121, at 42, 49-50.
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test a second theory. 130 Popper further required that all such background knowledge be "well corroborated," i.e., subject to extensive
testing itself, and that auxiliary hypotheses be investigated exhaustively. 13 ' A theory is therefore "scientific" insofar as it predicts or explains phenomena that may be tested against facts supported by
another well corroborated theory.13 2 Scientific inference according to
Popper is relative to the existing information, theories, and auxiliary
hypotheses; it is also ultimately a matter of convention supported by
judgment, not of rigorous deductive logic alone. According to Popper, the fallibility of science cannot be overcome; it can only be
counteracted by rigorous testing and critical analysis.
Thomas Kuhn built on Popper's work, but took it in a very different direction. 13 3 Where Popper claims discrete experiments can support scientific inference, Kuhn argues that experiments are
unavoidably ambiguous because no theory is ever consistent with all of
the available experimental evidence.1 3 4 Kuhn also inverts Popper's
priorities by arguing that the strength of science is its theoretical stability, not Popper's unrelentingly critical mode of inquiry. Kuhn believes scientific progress is made by scientists tenaciously investigating
an accepted theory, both because it generates cumulative knowledge
and because it propels theoretical innovation.13 5
Kuhn posits that science evolves through revolutionary shifts in
which an accepted theory is replaced by one that is radically different.1 36 He then develops this position by reconceptualizing important
scientific developments through two central constructs: scientific paradigms and normal science. 137 Under this framework, the progress
130 POPPER, supra note 118, at 112, 238-40; POPPER, supra note 121, at 75-77;
Lakatos, supra note 117, at 107-09.
131 POPPER, supra note 121, at 266-69; Lakatos, supra note 117, at 106-08.
132 POPPER, supra note 121, at 86-87, 104-05, 109-11.
133

See Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology Research?, in CITICISM AND
supra note 117, at 1, 1-3 (acknowledging the close simi-

THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE,

larity of his and Popper's views-on many issues).
134 Id. at 15-16. Drawing on historical examples, Kuhn shows that even for the
most fully corroborated paradigms, significant, unexplained contrary evidence exists.
See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 79, 81-83 (3d ed.
1996); see also PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 50-53 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that
even the most well corroborated theories may sometimes be inconsistent with the
evidence).
135 See KUHN, supranote 134, at 162-65. Kuhn also uses the natural selection metaphor. See id. at 146.
136

See id. at 92-94.

137 A paradigm has two basic elements: First, it represents the constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by a scientific community; second, it is sustained
by "concrete puzzle-solving" of problems discovered within a paradigm that arise as a
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from one paradigm to the next does not proceed through logical extensions because paradigms are incommensurable with each other,
meaning they are only imperfectly comparable or translatable. 138
Kuhn infers from this observation that theories cannot be rejected
solely based on inferences from experimental results-in his words,
the "decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another."139 The discontinuous nature of scientific developments leads Kuhn to conclude that adopting a new paradigm is
an almost quasi-religious "conversion experience" that requires an act
of "faith. ' 140 Kuhn does not, however, maintain that paradigm shifts

are utterly irrational. He believes that such revolutionary thinking is
justified by broad scientific values, such as simplicity, breadth, and
consistency, and that these values are just as critical to scientific progress as rigorous methods.1 4 1 Kuhn thus is not a scientific relativist;
he merely rejects the belief that science progresses through, and is
defined by, a shared "algorithmic decision procedure."1 42
For Kuhn, broad principles are integral to science, and it is the
acceptance of their inherent indeterminacy that allows him to grasp
what he believes is the great strength of science-normal science.
The theoretical stability of normal science enables cumulative data
collection and theory development to occur. Moreover, normal science either further corroborates a paradigm or (ultimately) precipitates a theoretical crisis, and paradigm shift, by exposing its
anomalies. 43 Thus, although Kuhn rejects the notion that scientific
progress can be prescribed algorithmically, through normal science
he discovers the conditions necessary for science to progress. 1 44 Kuhn
theory is elaborated. Id. at 175, 182-84. Normal science is limited to concrete puzzle
solving that is "firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements," which
are treated as fundamental and uncontested. Id. at 10.
138 See id. at 101-03, 122-23, 148-50; Thomas S. Kuhn, Possible Worlds in Histoy of
Science, in POSSIBLE WORLDS IN HUMANITIES, ARTS AND SCIENCES 9-11 (Sture Allen ed.,
1989); Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on my Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 117, at 231, 266-67. Kuhn has been convincingly criticized
on this point, for there are many examples in which competing theories and ideas
coexist (e.g., theories of matter). See, e.g., John Watkins, Against 'Normal Science,' in
CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 117, at 25, 34-36.
139 KUHN, supra note 134, at 77, 79.
140 Id.at 151, 156-58.
141 KUHN, supra note 11, at 330-34.
142 See id. at 326-27.
143 The virtue of normal science is paradoxical, for it is dogged commitment to a
paradigm and to its exploration that exposes a paradigm's weaknesses and causes its
failure. Id. at 96, 98, 165-70.
144 Despite their different frameworks, important parallels exist between Popper's
and Kuhn's perspectives. First, both theories rely on some form of tentatively ac-
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therefore distinguishes between scientific certainty, which he views as
unattainable, and progress, which he defines through the combined
workings of normal science and shifting scientific paradigms.
Significant disparities exist between how Popper and Kuhn portray science, on the one hand, and how science is typically understood,
within the legal community, on the other. The views of Breyer and
Wagner illustrate these differences. They believe that chemical risk
assessment and, in Breyer's case, regulatory science more generally,
lie somewhere on the margins of rigorous scientific practices. Breyer
is clearest on this point:
Predicting risk is a scientifically related enterprise, but it does not
involve scientists doing what they do best, namely developing theories about how x responds to y, others things being equal .... Scientists are happier looking for large differences in small populations
over short periods of time than looking for small differences in
large populations over long periods of time. To do the latter, they
must make many simplifying assumptions that are often
14 5
questionable.
This view manifests a limited understanding of what scientists do,
particularly with respect to the analytical and statistical methods they
employ. First, as Jeffreys's work demonstrates, not all science involves
running large numbers of carefully controlled experiments to test a
theory. 14 6 Many areas of science, such as ecological fieldwork and atmospheric science, rely on discrete observations that cannot be carefully controlled or indefinitely repeated. Scientists have also
constructed theoretical models and methods that require little empirical testing for them to be accepted. 14 7 Second, as Popper showed,
scientists routinely make simplifying assumptions in the face of uncertainty with the objective of iteratively testing the validity of these assumptions and the confidence scientists should have in them. The socepted theory: Kuhn relies on normal science; Popper utilizes background knowledge. Second, each theory posits a central mechanism that propels scientific
progress: Kuhn's mechanism is the breakdown of normal science; Popper's is a strict
critical mode of inquiry. Third, each approach has a model for scientific inference
and theory choice. On this point, however, a fundamental conceptual difference
emerges. Popper's model for scientific inference and theory choice is his convention
for critical analysis. Kuhn, in contrast, treats the two separately: scientific theory
choice is a matter of psychological conversion; scientific inference occurs within the
bounds of normal science. See KUHN, supra note 134, at 144-46. As a result, Popper
inherently places a higher premium on scientific judgment, while Kuhn views its role
as being generally limited by the theoretical boundaries of normal science.
145 BREYER, supra note 20, at 42-43.
146 See supra Part I.
147 See, e.g., LAUDAN, supra note 30, at 172-73.
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called trans-scientific junctures that Wagner and Breyer identify are
therefore central to all areas of science and not unique to chemical
risk assessment.
Popper and Kuhn show that, at some level, all scientific theories
are uncertain because they cannot be definitively proved or disproved.
Science thus does not consist of mechanical true-false testing, but
must turn on the degree of confidence a hypothesis warrants based on
whether it has withstood (or failed) rigorous testing 48 Further, scientific testing itself entails auxiliary hypotheses and background
knowledge, both of which will vary in the degree to which they are
corroborated. Risk assessors' assumptions about extrapolation models
are, for instance, directly analogous to the auxiliary hypotheses climate scientists integrate into their atmospheric models. 149 In the former, risk assessors typically assume a linear relationship exists between
chemical dose and risk, even at very low exposure levels; in the latter,
climate scientists must make myriad assumptions to derive a relationship between greenhouse gas levels and mean global surface temperature. These judgments are unremarkable because experimental work
is scientific insofar as models and hypotheses are rigorously tested and
evaluated-science is "a process rather than the product of
150
inquiry."
The categorical division between science and trans-science, implicit in Breyer's work and explicit in Wagner's, conflicts with this view
of science as process. Trans-science is typically defined as involving
judgments that are unresolvable by science, and thus presumptively
matters of policy. 15 1 This definition has intuitive appeal at the extremes-the question whether the sun is going to rise tomorrow is
clearly not a matter of policy. The problem is that once one goes
beyond such simple cases, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine what is science and what is policy. Is the decision to use a simpli148 FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 82, at 239-40.
149 Oreskes et al., supra note 83, at 642 ("The problem of deductive verification is
that if the verification fails, there is often no way to know whether the principal hypothesis or some auxiliary hypothesis is at fault."). Climate scientists must contend
with a global-scale system and integrate a vast range of interactions, including solar
physics and energy balancing, atmospheric chemistry, and ocean-atmosphere interac-

tions. L.D.

DANNY HARVEY, GLOBAL WARMING: THE HARD SCIENCE

121-29 (2000). Cal-

culating the human impact on climate requires scientists to model mathematically
each of these features of Earth's climate system. Id.
150 GASKINS, supra note 83, at 152-53; Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,

151

Spring/Summer 2001, at 327, 331-32.

See supra Part II.A; Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1619

nn.21-22.
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fled model of experimental conditions a matter of scientific judgment
or a matter of policy? Or, is the choice between two experimental
methods, neither of which is ideal, a policy decision or a scientific
determination? Scientists make innumerable decisions like these and,
because of their own limited knowledge, also make many implicit
judgments that they may not even be able to articulate. 152 It is difficult to see how trans-science can be defined in a coherent manner
because, as Popper's work implies, scientific proof accrues in shades
of gray; it does not fall neatly into resolvable and unresolvable
categories.
Lawyers encounter an analogue of this line drawing problem in
critiques of formalist theories of judicial review. As described in the
Introduction, legal formalism limits judicial textual interpretation to
the plain meaning of the Constitution (just as scientific positivism is
limited to facts). Critics of legal formalism point out that it encounters a crucial problem when resolving how generally a constitutional provision should be construed. 5 3 For example, it is unclear
whether the constitutional right to privacy should extend to married
couples, to heterosexual couples, to all consensual adult relationships,
or to all consensual relationships regardless of the age or maturity of
the individuals. 154 Strict legal formalism, as a consequence, is viable
for only trivial cases of judicial review, making antiformalist methods
unavoidable. This uncertainty is just another instance of underdetermination: Judges are unable to rule out competing interpretations because specific constitutional language is consistent with
several competing interpretations, which are supportable by various
auxiliary principles a judge may invoke. The science/trans-science
distinction is empty for the same reason: Developing science-meaning most science-falls under the category of trans-science, making
the distinction heavily one-sided and of limited practical utility.
These problems suggest that the focus on trans-science is misdirected and, at best, a surrogate for what I believe is the real issue-the
proper scope of scientific discretion in environmental decisionmaking. The legal analogy applies here as well: The concept of trans-science is used to establish a boundary for scientific expertise that
circumscribes what is deemed unalloyed science in the same manner
in which legal formalism is often used to limit judicial discretion.
152 Similarly, relying on scientific consensus to delimit science from trans-science,
as Wagner does, is troublesome because it is unclear what degree of consensus (or
conflict) is sufficient. Furthermore, some important judgments may not be subject to
broad scientific debate, making the concept of consensus all but irrelevant.
153 See Brest, supra note 14, at 1084-85.
154 Id.
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Once a question is declared trans-scientific, scientific judgment is presumptively owed less (perhaps no) deference and other factors, particularly societal values, are elevated for consideration. 15 5 There are, of
course, very good reasons for questioning whether scientists should
have the authority to make decisions that involve matters of policy
that transcend their technical knowledge and expertise. Unfortunately, the debate over trans-science has not fostered much thoughtful reflection on scientific discretion; instead, its primary utility has
been as an offensive weapon against purportedly overzealous reliance
on scientific methods.
An examination of the need for and scope of scientific discretion
requires a different approach. Assessing the proper scope of scientific
discretion is dependent on one's theory of science, just as judicial discretion is tied to one's theory of judicial review. Scientific positivism,
for example, limits scientific discretion to a narrow reading of experimental evidence, whereas Kuhn's theory, which is premised on a balance between standard analytical methods (normal science) and
broad principles, affords scientists relatively broad discretion. This association makes it all the more important for lawyers and policymakers to have a concrete understanding of how science is conducted, as
they are often in the position of determining how scientific judgments
are utilized in environmental law. However, the current debate over
environmental science ignores this relationship because it lapses either into positivist caricature, which ignores scientific judgment altogether, or relativist critique, which portrays scientific judgments as
inherently political and a matter of policy. The debate over the
proper role of scientific expertise in environmental policymaking
ought to move beyond these misleading images of science.
A relatively straightforward case can be made for the importance
of scientific discretion and judgment in good science. The preceding
discussion suggests three basic arguments. First, scientists routinely
make judgments in the face of uncertainty, as opposed to slavishly relying on empirical results from which they mechanically derive their
conclusions. Consequently, the experience and knowledge upon
which scientists draw are of significant value in setting environmental
policy. Second, as both Popper and Kuhn demonstrate, science is a
process that is reliant on individual judgments and discretion. Protecting the integrity of this process, which must include substantial
latitude for individual judgments, is essential if environmental science
155 Breyer's position on this point is mystifying, as he described what scientists like
to do in narrow terms and then granted them extremely broad discretion to set environmental policy. See BREYER, supra note 20, at 42-43, 64-68.
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is going to progress. 15 6 Third, the authority of science does not derive
from some form of analytical determinism-scientific methods are fallible and uncertain-but from the potential for science to achieve a
status of accepted truth. 1 57 In short, the scientific processes used to
establish facts as accepted truths are contingent on, and thus warrant,
scientific judgment.
These points in no way diminish the importance of political concerns about relying on scientific expertise. Instead, they reveal that
important tradeoffs exist between deferring to and overriding scientific judgments in environmental policymaking. The term trans-science proves misleading because it presumes the scientific process can
be separated from policymaking. In particular, while it is true that
well accepted science can be separated from policy, the process used
to attain them cannot, as it entails numerous scientific judgments that
invariably have important implications for policy. As environmentalists have often argued, the scientific process (like its judicial counterpart) encompasses matters that are hybrid in nature-both questions
of science and questions of policy. The challenge inherent in environmental law is to maintain the integrity of both the political and
scientific processes at the same time. In this light, the proposals that
Breyer and Wagner advocate represent contrasting judgments about
156 Concerns about the corruption of science by politics is evident in objections to
the Bush Administration's selection processes for members of federal agency scientific advisory boards and in the volatility of debates over climate change and genetically modified organisms. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; Roger A. Pielke,
Policy, Politicsand Perspective: The Scientific Community Must DistinguishAnalysis From Advocacy, 416 NATURE 367, 367-68 (2003) (decrying the politicization of science and
urging the scientific community to establish formal institutional mechanisms that
buffer science from policymaking). Lysenkoism in Russia, from about 1935 to 1964, is
the classic example of politics undermining the integrity of science. Trofim Lysenko
was a leading proponent of the Lamarckian theory of evolution, which held that beneficial traits could be cultivated and developed during an organism's lifetime and
passed on to its offspring. Lysenko was responsible for popularizing this theory and
obtaining the support of the Soviet leadership. He was also instrumental in the censorship, disappearance, and imprisonment of numerous scientists who advocated Darwinian natural selection and Mendelian genetics. Russian biology, as a result,
languished for three decades under the burden of the governing communist ideology. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientfic Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REV. 715, 769-71 (1994).
157 The political scientist Ian Shapiro makes a similar point: "Science holds out
the hope that we can get beyond the welter of conflicting opinions and ideological
claims to the truth of the matter; that we can come to hold a set of beliefs about an
entity, event, or action that is most reasonable under the circumstances . ...
[A] lthough this is often difficult in practice, there is no reason to rule it out in principle." IAN SHAPIRO, POLITICAL CRITICISM 274 (1990).
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protecting scientific and political processes, and the weaknesses in
their respective approaches are a testament to just how difficult it is to
formulate a framework for achieving such a balance. In Part IV, I
enter the fray further by proposing an alternative to the approaches
advocated by Breyer and Wagner.
The third rationale for scientific authority and discretion is perhaps the most important and least understood. Skepticism about science is often fueled by the general public's lack of understanding
about how science is practiced and how it progresses. Skeptics with
relativist leanings, in particular, challenge whether scientific truths exist at all and whether science should be accorded the level of authority
it often receives. The next section describes scientific methods in detail and makes the case for the power of science to generate accepted
truths. Again, my objective is not to argue that science should be set
above everything else, but rather to substantiate the claim that important tradeoffs exist between scientific progress and political considerations, and to show how scientific truths emerge from the uncertainties
Popper and Kuhn exposed.
C.

Experimental Bootstrapping as an Answer to Underdetermination

Breyer and Wagner are correct in portraying chemical risk science as methodologically weak, but the problem is not its simplifying
assumptions per se. The flaw in chemical risk models is that current
testing methods are neither sufficiently stringent nor well corroborated. An important objective for environmental policy in the area of
chemical risk assessment therefore ought to be the development of
more powerful testing methods. This would require both a major
shift in the science, given the inherent limitations of current chemical
testing methods, and significant additional resources.1 58 The views of
legal scholars such as Breyer and Wagner, however, provide little incentive for such a forward looking approach. To the contrary, debates
about environmental science among lawyers have come precariously
close to rejecting the contributions science can make in deepening
our understanding of chemical toxicology.
Legal commentators fail to acknowledge that basic experimental
methods can circumvent the broad theoretical uncertainties Popper
and Kuhn identified. 59 Specifically, independent and diverse testing
158 See BREYER, supranote 20, at 43-47; Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5,
at 1620-27.
159 This approach rejects Popper's extreme form of underdetermination, which
treats "the logically possible and the reasonable [as] coextensive." LAUDAN, supra
note 30, at 29; see also id. at 37-40. Popper's underdetermination thesis amounts to
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methods diminish the importance of theoretical underdetermination
in obtaining evidence of the truth or falsity of a scientific hypothesis.
The power of this approach is illustrated by the late nineteenth century dispute over biometrics and Mendelism. 160 The scientific debate
over biometrics and Mendelism was highly politicized because biometrics provided the scientific basis for the eugenics movement, which
was popular at the time. 6 1 The dispute stalled, however, because
neither theory was well grounded and only limited experimental
methods were available. 162 Scientists debated the form in which the
data were quantified: Mendelian scientists used a binary metric that
categorized traits into opposites, such as "hairy" or "hairless" and "yellow" or "green."1 63 Biometricians used continuous variables, replacing, for example, the hairy-hairless categories with a continuous
measure of the number of hairs per unit area. 164 Both groups
adopted metrics based on their respective theories to validate them.
the "assumption that, unless we can show that a scientific hypothesis cannot possibly
be reconciled with the evidence, then we have no epistemic grounds for faulting
those who espouse that hypothesis." Id. at 29. In other words, if I can contrive a
hypothesis, no matter how implausible, that is equally supported by the existing data,
then no epistemologically valid reason exists to prefer the hypothesis under investigation over this alternative. The standard example illustrates this point using a collection of observations all finding that emeralds are green. According to the
underdetermination thesis, the hypothesis that all emeralds are green is epistemically
equivalent to the "Grue" hypothesis, which maintains that all emeralds are green until
a new observation is made, after which all emeralds will be blue. While it is true that
both theories are logically equivalent, insofar as they both entail the existing data
equally well, it stretches credulity to assert that both are equally reasonable. See id. at
43-44. This section explains how experimental methods differentiate competing
theories.
160 Biometrics and Mendelism were hotly contested at the time. "The biometricians... believed that evolution was a process of gradual change, taking place
by the selection of continuous differences." DONALD A. MACKENZIE, STATISTICS IN
BRITAIN 1865-1930, at 130 (1981). Mendelism, in contrast, held that evolution occurred through discontinuous changes in species as certain traits were activated or
deactivated. Id. at 131-33.
161 See id. at 29-31, 36-40, 52-56.
162 See id. at 120-22.
163 Id. at 129. "The two sides could not always agree even on the facts that stood in
need of explanation or description." Id. at 123.
164 Id. at 129. At the time, an important methodological debate existed over the
statistical validity of two methods for summing up data. Id. at 153, 161-75. One
group of statisticians argued for the statistical validity of "interval" (continuous) variables, which clearly supported biometrics; a second group urged "nominal" (categorical) variables, which provided a statistical model for Mendelism. The two methods of
statistically summing up the data naturally reflected the ideological biases of the individuals who developed them, and the two statistical methods reflected the theory of
evolution each supported. Id. at 168-75. Biometrics was premised on the continuous
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These different approaches to scaling the data made the experimental results incompatible with each other. 16 5 Data collected by a
Mendelian scientist presupposed Mendelian traits that fell into strict
categories, whereas data collected by a biometrics scientist was premised on continuously variable traits that could not be fit into Mendelian categories. This incommensurability arose because each group of
scientists used their respective theories to construct experimental statistics. As such, neither statistical test was severe in Popperian terms.
First, the observation method used, here embodied in the sample statistics, was premised solely on the theory being tested.' 66 Second,
neither theory was well corroborated. The resulting experiments were
weak and circular.1 67 However, circular in this context does not mean
tautological, as the data could have contradicted the Mendelian theory if, for example, no consistent patterns of heredity were observed. 168 Rather, this circularity implies the test was narrow, much as
if one were to base a broad legal doctrine on a single case or incident.
The indeterminacy of the science and the surrounding politics
69
split the scientific community into ideological factions for years.'
The weaknesses of both sets of experiments led to a stalemate because
no independently acceptable basis existed to assess the relative merits
of the two theories. Indeed, this same circularity is evident in many
variation of biological traits because it maintained that evolution occurred incrementally, whereas Mendelism asserted that biological traits, and thus evolution, were
discontinuous, shifting from one state to another.
165 See id. at 122-24 ("The incommensurability of the two positions [did lead] to
difficulties of understanding and communication.").
166

IANHAcKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING 183-85

(1983) (providing an ex-

ample of the same dependence of observation and theory in solar physics).
167 See KARl R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HIsToRICISM 108-11 (1957) (raising the
same objection in a different context).
168 Kuhn describes this circularity in a slightly different manner:
If... there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language
or concepts, then the proposed construction of alternate tests and theories
must proceed from within one or another paradigm-based tradition. Thus
restricted it would have no access to all possible experiences or to all possible theories. As a result, probabilistic theories disguise the verification situation as much as they illuminate it.... Verification is like natural selection: it
picks out the most viable among the actual alternatives in a particular historical situation.
KUHN, supra note 134, at 146.
Statistical testing, in short, is subservient to substantive theory, and is no more
able to resolve scientific questions beyond the theoretical framework from which it
originates than scientists operating within a given paradigm.
169 See id. at 120-22 (discussing how scientists may come up with different conclusions based on the same observations, to show the indeterminacy of science).
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risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses, which lack good independent observational methods and well-established theory. Two critical
points emerge from this example: (1) The process of defining a statistical variable imposes significant analytical constraints and reflects the
subservience of statistical quantification to scientific theory, and (2)
statistical methods are far less powerful if they are dependent on the
theory being tested. 17() The Mendelism-biometrics dispute also reveals
how and why weak scientific methods reduce questions of quantification to ideological factionalism.
Independent observational techniques overcome circular testing
methods and minimize problems that derive from the theory-laden
nature of facts. 1 71 In doing so, this approach decouples theory from
fact to a high degree.1 72 A standard example of this strategy involves
the first observation of "dense bodies" in red blood cells. 173 When
dense bodies were initially observed, the scientist conducting the experiment believed they were an artifact of his observational method,
here an electron microscope. I7 4 To test this hypothesis, he selected a
different observational technique, a fluorescence microscope, which
170 These practical and epistemological limits derive from chance being in part a
measure of human knowledge. The temperature of a gas, for example, operates as a
meaningful measure of its total kinetic energy, and thus represents a discrete physical
property that is accurately represented by a single metric. One can make such a claim
only because the governing physical theory is well established. Other statistical metrics, such as IQ or risk, are much less well theoretically and empirically corroborated.
(It is interesting to note that IQ tests were often characterized as a "clinical thermometer." JOANNE BROWN, THE DEFINITION OF A PROFESSION: THE AUTHORITY OF METAPHOR IN THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE TESTING, 1890-1930, at 76-77, 81 (1992).)
While it is natural for Bayesians to accept these epistemological constraints, frequentists' aspirations for objectivity run counter to accepting these deeper philosophical
limitations..
Both statistical schools have nevertheless characterized statistical techniques in
terms of "summarizing" data or evidence, which both qualifies the purported objectivity of quantitative statistical techniques and highlights their reductive functions. Frequency-type theorists, for example, have stated that statistical information is best
understood as an "extremely brief summary of the [available] data bearing on the
true value of some magnitude [of a system or thing]." HACKING, supra note 33, at 173;
see also HACKING, supra note 12, at 214-15. Similarly, Bayesians have claimed that
Bayes's method "sum [s]up the evidential meaning of new information." Id. at 181;
see also HoWIE, supra note 37, at 114-15 (preferring a "Simplicity Postulate" to the
"frequency theory").
171 See HACKING, supra note 166, at 184-85 (arguing both that observation-theory
independence generates more compelling experiments and that the experiments
themselves are not necessarily dependent on theory); LAUDAN, supra note 30, 48-49.
172 See MAYO, supra note 23, at 16-17.
173 See Hacking, supra note 166, at 200-02.
174 Id.
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operated according to completely different physical principles. 175 As
it happened, the scientist observed the dense bodies with the fluorescence microscope, refuting his original hypothesis that they were an
artifact. 176 The logic behind this approach is straightforward:
Two physical processes... are used to detect [dense] bodies. These
processes have virtually nothing in common between them. They
are essentially unrelated chunks of physics. It would be preposterous coincidence if, time and again, two completely different physical processes produced identical visual configurations which were,
however, artifacts of the physical processes rather than real struc177
tures in the cell.
Under this approach, the crucial assumption (i.e., auxiliary hypothesis) is the independence of the distinct fields from which the
observational methods derive. Further, by taking advantage of the
theoretical disunity of science in this manner, the significance of highlevel theories (which invariably require more simplifying assumptions
17 8
to test) is minimized because an overarching theory is unnecessary.
The examples discussed so far bear out the value of this approach. Since the Mendelism-biometrics dispute arose in the nineteenth century, scientists have made huge advances in biochemistry
and analytical chemistry, which in turn have enabled genes to be observed and tested through a variety of experimental methods. These
developments avoided the circularity of the earlier debate and
defused it altogether. In short, science reduced an ideology-laden debate over statistical quantification to one based on well corroborated,
independently validated facts. Such shifts in theory and experimental
methods continue to be critical today. For example, recent developments in toxicogenomics, which involves the application of rapid genetic screening methods to the field of toxicology,1 79 are likely to
revolutionize current chemical toxicity testing methods by offering
175
176
177
178

179

Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208-09; see also MAYo, supra note 23, at 8-9, 16-17.

Toxicogenomics is based on obtaining a profile of
the cell-wide changes in gene expression following exposure to toxins. This

approach creates the potential to provide a molecular "fingerprint" of exposure or toxicological response to specific classes of toxic substances .... The
toxicological significance of gene expression changes must be validated, including an evaluation of the robustness of [gene expression] results between
or across different laboratories, species, individuals, tissues and time periods.
Gary E. Marchant, Toxicogenomics and Toxic Torts, 20 TRENDS INBIOTECH. 329, 329-30
(2002).
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new faster, less expensive alternatives. 180 These methods also have the
potential to achieve for toxic risk assessment what biochemistry did
for Mendelian genetics-the replacement of a weak testing regime
with a set of diverse, independent methods. 18 1 The critical point here
is that science can lead to an array of independent testing methods,
which both generate reliable, objectively verifiable data and enhance
our theoretical understanding of challenging problems in environmental science.
The value of this approach lies not just in the credibility of the
science, but also in efficiency gains. Research on climate change, for
example, is heavily dependent on statistical methods because the principal metric of climate change is a statistically averaged global surface
temperature.18 2 Predictably, this single metric approach has been
criticized because it obscures a great deal of important regional information. 8 3 The response of scientists has been pragmatic and pluralistic: develop the best information possible using a single metric and, at
the same time, work towards developing alternative predictors of climate change.' 8 4 Under this approach, climate change research is not
limited to a group of chemists and physicists developing massive computer models for simulating future increases in the average global surface temperature. Instead, studies in areas as diverse as lake ecology,
glaciology, tropospheric chemistry, and volcanism are being conducted under the umbrella of climate change research. 8 5 These
studies do not provide data that are fed directly into large-scale climate models; instead, they create a composite picture, based on inde180 See id. at 330-32; see alsoJocelyn Kaiser, Tying Genetics to the Risk of Environmental
Diseases, 300 SCIENCE 563, 563 (2003); Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31
SETON HALL L. REv. 949, 980 (2001); Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances:
Part I-Toxicogenomics, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,071 passim (2003).
181 Marchant, supra note 179, at 329.
182 See supra note 77; HARVEY, supra note 149, at 75; Stephen H. Schneider, Detecting Climatic Change Signals: Are There Any "Fingerprints"?,263 SCIENCE 341 (1994).
The limits of existing climate models force a methodological compromise: scientists
must balance their interests in exploiting more detailed information using a multivariate method against obtaining data relevant to existing climate models. See id. at
341.
183 Schneider, supra note 182, at 341, 345. To their credit, climate scientists have
openly acknowledged the limits of a single metric approach. See id.; CLIMATE CHANCE:
THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT xii-xiii, XXV, xxxv-xxxix, 247-48 (J.T. Houghton et
al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter IPCC].
184 See Schneider, supra note 182, at 345-46; IPCC, supra note 183, at 247-48.
Scientists must "[w]ork across many scales and disciplines to understand physical,
chemical, biological, and relevant societal processes, [and] their interactions .
Schneider, supra note 182, at 345.
185 HARVEY, supra note 149, ch. 2.
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pendent measurements, that is far more powerful than any one of the
studies on its own ever could be. This pluralistic approach is critical
because climate models are decades away from being able to predict
regional impacts with a reasonable level of accuracy. Complementary
studies fill in some of these gaps and enhance the credibility of the
science as a whole.
The advances in climate change research have been extraordinary given the relative youth and difficulty of the field. In an area
arguably far more complex than chemical toxicology, scientists have
produced predictive models, numerous experimental methods, and a
huge amount of valuable information. This success derives in significant part from the multidisciplinary approach scientists have taken
and their cultivation of independent measurements. A secondary
benefit of this strategy is that it often allows scientists to make simpler
arguments-explaining why two methods are distinct often is easier
than explaining their mechanisms in detail. Similar to the complementary microscope measurements described in the dense body example, most people can understand intuitively that atmospheric
physics and glacial ice core data derive from distinct areas of science
and that complementary results from independent fields strongly reinforce each other. This accessibility and the decoupling of fact from
theory lessens, though by no means eliminates, the ideological nature
of the debate over climate change in the scientific community and, to
a lesser degree, beyond it as well.
As lawyers, we inevitably focus on institutional and legal mechanisms for solving difficult problems in environmental policy. This tendency is encouraged by current polarized conceptions of science,
which characterize science either as mechanistic or as infused with
difficult value judgments and theoretical indeterminacies. As I have
tried to show above, neither science nor its quantitative methods fall
neatly into these extremes. Simple experimental strategies can generate reliable facts even where significant theoretical indeterminacies
exist. Environmental law and policy would benefit from lawyers and
policymakers having a greater appreciation of the basic experimental
methods used to resolve important controversies in environmental
science.
III.

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT TRADITIONAL STATISTICAL METHODS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Statistical methods, either Bayesian or frequentist, provide the basic analytical framework for scientists to draw inferences from the experiments they conduct. Laypeople typically associate statistical
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inference with frequentist significance tests, which assess whether experimental data deviate "significantly" from the predictions of a test
hypothesis. Statistical significance for most people therefore implies
that a scientist has discovered an effect not predicted by that scientist's
starting hypothesis. Few lawyers, and indeed relatively few scientists,
have experience with Bayesian methods, which directly measure the
probability that a hypothesis is true rather than providing a rigorous
test of its validity. This Part will examine frequentist methods of statistical inference and will focus on presumptions about burdens of proof
in drawing scientific inferences from discrete scientific studies-stage
two of the three-stage framework described in the Introduction. Bayesian methods will be considered in the final Part of the Article.
Frequency-type statistical inference, as discussed in Part I, is inextricably tied to a world view in which phenomena are defined by their
frequencies in abstract populations or classes. Environmentalists find
this view problematic for two central reasons. First, statistical inference becomes dependent on this dubious "bingo game" model of the
universe and science is practiced by experimentally isolating and randomly sampling such populations. 186 For environmentalists, this
model appears to conflict with more holistic ecological models, as it is
premised on a disconnected and atomized world ruled by chance.
Second, and most importantly for this Part, frequentist methods almost invariably presume that environmental impacts are benign until
proven guilty. 187 In order to connect the discussion to a familiar legal
doctrine, I will examine criticism of frequentist methods that are
based on the Precautionary Principle, which draws on and is intended
to alter traditional methods of scientific inference. 18 The tensions
between frequentist statistical methods and the Precautionary Principle will be evaluated (largely agnostically), and a novel approach to
186 See HOWIE, supra note 37, at 74; Collins, supra note 30, at 336. Recall the guiding metaphor of frequentist statistics is Mendelian genetics, under which long-run
frequencies are determined by random selections of specific traits, as opposed to specific relationships or causes (i.e., biological, chemical, or physical). See supra Part I.
187 See Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger, Precautionary Science, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH

&

THE ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 85, at 106, 111-12; Carl F.

Cranor, Asymmetric Information, The PrecautionaryPrinciple, and Burdens of Proof in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH

&

THE ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 85, at 74, 79; D.H. Kaye, Is

Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1345 (1986).
188 Barrett & Raffensperger, supra note 187, at 108-09, 115; Andrew Jordan &
Timothy O'Riordan, The PrecautionaryPrinciplein ContemporaryEnvironmentalPolicy and
Politics, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 85, at 15, 17
(noting that the Precautionary Principle "challenges the established scientific
method").
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frequentist statistical testing will be proposed that addresses concerns
about systemic biases in traditional methods of scientific inference.
The Precautionary Principle embodies the old adage "better safe
than sorry" by placing protection of public health and the environment above other interests even when evidence of harm is not proven
definitively.1 8 9 The Precautionary Principle is premised on the belief
that "[i]f there is a potential for harm from an activity and if there is
uncertainty about the magnitude of impacts or causality, then anticipatory action should be taken to avoid harm."19 0 The Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development describes the Precautionary Principle as follows: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation."'' 91
In at least some of its myriad formulations, the Precautionary
Principle proposes a balancing test of sorts, under which the potential
level of harm, degree of scientific uncertainty, and likely alternatives
for a product or action are assessed to determine the appropriate regulatory strategy.' 92 If, for example, the potential level of harm from a
product is great, the scientific uncertainty significant, and numerous
low cost alternatives available, the Precautionary Principle would favor
a ban on the product. Conversely, if the level of harm is low, the scientific uncertainty minimal, and the alternatives limited and very expensive, the Precautionary Principle would favor less stringent
189 Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,53 WASH. &
REv. 851, 851 (1996).

190
at 1.

Introductionto

PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH

&

THE ENVIRONMENT,

LEE

L.

supranote 85,

191
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Env't &
Dev., U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874, 880 (1992). Different versions of the Precautionary Principle appear in a
variety of other international agreements. See David Santillo et al., The Precautionary
Principlein Practice, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 85,
at 36, 41-45.
192 See Nicholas A. Ashford, A Conceptual Framework for the Use of the Precautionary
Principlein Law, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 85, at
198, 199-200 (discussing the elements of the Precautionary Principle); Jordan &
O'Riordan, supra note 188, at 25 (" [P] recaution is often linked to some consideration
of risks, financial costs, and benefits."); Deborah Katz, The Mismatch Between the Bio-

safety Protocol and the PrecautionaryPrinciple,13

GEO. INT'L ENVTL.

L. REV. 949, 956-57

(2001) (illustrating the elements of the Precautionary Principle).
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regulation. More complicated balancing is required when cases fall
between these extremes.
The Precautionary Principle has both Bayesian and frequentist
characteristics. The balancing test described above, for example, suggests a straightforward weighting of the evidence that would be compatible with a Bayesian approach. However, perhaps because
frequentist methods are better known, the Precautionary Principle is
more often discussed in frequentist terms. Thus, proponents of the
Precautionary Principle justify it on the ground that the uncertainty of
risk ought to be borne by the regulated industry, rather than the "potential victims.' I 93 This rationale is often expressed in terms borrowed from frequency-type probability theory:
When a regulator makes a decision under conditions of uncertainty,
there are two possible types of error. The regulator can overregulate a risk that turns out to be insignificant or the regulator can
underregulate a risk that turns out to be significant. If the regulator
erroneously underregulates, the burden of this mistake falls on
those individuals who are injured or killed, and their families. If a
regulator erroneously overregulates, the burden of this mistake falls
on the regulated industry[,] which will pay for regulation that is not
needed. This result, however, is fairer than setting the burden of
94
uncertainty about a risk on potential victims.'
As this account suggests, the Precautionary Principle incorporates
basic rules about minimizing error rates from frequentist inference
methods.' 95 In this context, erroneous overregulation and underregulation are variants of statistical significance (i.e., Type I error or
false positives) and power (i.e., Type II error or false negatives).196
Environmentalists have used the frequentist framework to argue that
193 Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice
Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 721, 732 (1995).
194 Id. Under this view, differences in who bears the risk (victims versus stockholders, employers, and consumers), the number of people who bear the risk (few versus
many), and the types of risks (financial versus emotional and psychological) justify
affording higher protection to "potential victims." Id.
195 See Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 207, 219-20, 230-39 (1978). This early articulation of the Precautionary Principle drew directly on frequency-type probability theory:
The costs of wrong decisions are asymmetric for environmental risk in inverse proportion to the potential net costs and benefits associated with each
of the two hypotheses. The cost of a false negative-deciding that the benign hypothesis is true when it is not-is much higher than the cost of a false
positive-deciding that the catastrophic hypothesis is true when it is not.
Id. at 220 (footnote omitted).
196 See infra Part III.A.
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Type II errors, meaning the risks from underregulation, should be
accorded much greater weight than Type I errors in standard statistical tests used in regulatory environmental science. 19 7 Of course, one
could, and many people do, disagree with this approach as a general
rule, as instances will exist in which the net societal harm from overregulation is greater than underregulation. 198 For the purposes of
this discussion, disagreements over this point are unimportant; one
need only accept that the risks from underregulation sometimes will
clearly outweigh those from overregulation.
The conventional levels for statistical significance are an obvious
target because they are arbitrarily set.199 If one accepts the Precautionary Principle, raising Type I errors and lowering Type II errors in
the regulatory context is thus perfectly acceptable to account for asymmetries between potential victims and regulated industries. 20 0 However, while this rationale is valid, it often ignores the indirect nature of
frequentist concepts and overemphasizes their role in scientific determinations. To begin with, statistical significance is a measure of the
reliability of a statistical test; it is not a direct standard of persuasion
like "beyond a reasonable doubt."20 1 Thus, the direct result from raising the significance level of a statistical test is that the threshold for
rejecting a test hypothesis is lowered. 20 2 This change is only indirectly
197 See Ashford, supra note 192, at 202-03; Barrett & Raffensperger, supra note
187, at 117; Lene Buhl-Mortensen, Type-II StatisticalErrors in EnvironmentalScience and
the Precautionary Principle,32 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 528, 529-31 (1996); Cranor,
supra note 187, at 79; Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis With The Principle
That Safety Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118-19 (2001); Reed F.
Noss, Some Principles of ConservationBiology, As They Apply to EnvironmentalLaw, 69 CHI.KENT L. REv. 893, 896-97 (1994); Randall M. Peterman & Michael M'Gonigle, Statistical Power Analysis and the Precautionary Principle, 24 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 231,
231-33 (1992); K-S. Shrader-Frechette & E.D. McCoy, Statistics, Costs and Rationality in
EcologicalInference, 7 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 96, 97 (1992); Michele Territo,
The PrecautionaryPrinciple in MarineFisheries Conservation and the US. SustainableFisheries Act of 1996, 24 VT. L. REv. 1351, 1351-52 (2000).
198 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 189, at 859-61.
199 See infra Part III.A.; HACKING, supra note 12, at 225; Collins, supra note 30, at
339.
200 Page, supra note 195, at 230-39.
201 See David F. Parkhurst, StatisticalSignificance Tests: Equivalence and Reverse Tests
Should Reduce Misinterpretation,51 BIOSCIENCE 1051, 1057 (2001); see also Lawrence H.
Lehmann, The Fisher,Neyman-Pearson Theories of Testing Hypotheses: One Theory or Two?,
88 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1242, 1243 (1993) (noting that mathematical uncertainty or
probability is not an adequate expression of uncertain inferences of every kind).
202 See infra Part III.A (noting that statistical testing thus involves a one-sided competition between the null hypothesis and the conjecture that turns on the fidelity of
the null-hypothesis model in matching the experimental data).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

79:2

related to a legally required burden of persuasion, and its impact on
Type II errors is not as simple as it might seem initially. 20 3 The following sections clarify these relations, suggest a direct method for addressing environmentalists' concerns about Type II errors and
allocating the burden of proof, and examine the respective limits of
statistical inference and the Precautionary Principle in scientific
decisionmaking.
A.

The Indirect Nature of Frequentist Statistical Inference

The frequentist definition of probability is central to understanding traditional methods of statistical significance testing. Frequentists
define probability as the long-run frequency or propensity of a population, system, or thing. 20 4 The properties that may be studied are

almost infinitely variable, limited only by imagination and what can be
measured. The concept of long-run frequency has been aptly characterized as "combin [ing] individual irregularity with aggregate regularity," such that measurement of a system's long-run frequency
20 5
converges to a fixed value as the number of observations increases.
The long-run frequency of a fair coin turning up heads, for example,
20 6
converges to one-half as the number of trials approaches infinity.

Scientists thus collect repeated measurements (i.e., sample) of a population to obtain an accurate measure of such long-run frequencies.
Statistical significance testing assesses the correspondence of such statistical samples with hypotheses regarding the true long-run population frequency being measured.
Statistical inference for frequentists revolves around determining
the degree to which an experimental sample statistic is approximated
by a normal distribution model. 20 7 For example, suppose you believe
203 See, e.g., George Casella & Roger L. Berger, ReconcilingBayesian and Frequentist
Evidence in the One-Side Testing Problem, 82 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 106 (1987); Morris H.
DeGroot, Doing What Comes Naturally: Interpretinga Tail Area as a PosteriorProbability or
as a Likelihood Ratio, 68J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 966 (1973).

204
205

supra note 33, at 1-2.
Id. at 5 (quoting JOHN VENN, THE

HACKING,

LOGIC OF CHANCE

4 (London, Chelsea

1866)); see also HACKING, supra note 12, at 145, 190-91, 196-97.
206 HACKING, supra note 12, at 191-92; HACKING, supra note 33, at 214. Propensity
theorists ignore long-run frequencies, focusing instead on those attributes that cause
fixed frequencies. See HACKING, supra note 12, at 145; PORTER, supra note 29, at
121-22. A die, for example, has symmetry properties that dictate its probabilistic tendencies. According to this account, probabilistic models, like abstract physical theories, embody mathematically specific properties of the systems or things they
accurately represent.
207 The "binomial distribution" is a mathematically precise representation of a
coin tossing system; the normal distribution is a fair approximation to the binomial
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the coin in your pocket is fair and you want to test the validity of this
starting hypothesis by flipping the coin a thousand times. For any
fixed number of observations, the normal distribution offers a simplified model for the distribution between heads and tails, which in this
case predicts that there is about a two-thirds probability of the number
of heads lying between 495 and 505 and a 0.95 probability of it lying
between 490 and 510.208 The normal distribution in this case provides

a mathematical approximation of experimental conditions in which
variability is purely random and the coin has an equal probability of
obtaining a heads or tails on each toss (fairness). If your experimental result were 491 heads, you would be reasonably confident in the
fairness of the coin; conversely, if your experimental result were 400
heads, you would likely question your initial hypothesis about the
20 9
coin's fairness.
Testing a pesticide's toxicity provides a more informative and realistic example of significance testing. 2 10 The basic approach, however, is the same: Just as a normal distribution can be used to model

the behavior of a fair coin, it may be used as a model of experimental
conditions limited by random errors, which requires a carefully controlled testing regime. 2 11 Frequentists utilize the following convention for hypothesis testing: (1) a "null" hypothesis, which assumes no
effect exists (i.e., the pesticide is harmless); and (2) a "conjecture,"
which assumes some effect exists (i.e., the pesticide has a discernable
distribution for tests involving at least thirty trials (i.e., flips of the coin). MAYO, supra
note 23, at 171.
208 HACKING, supra note 12, at 203-04, 206.
209 The detailed analysis is actually a little more complicated. The assumption
that the coin is fair implies that an event of probability much less than one percent
would have occurred if you obtained 400 heads. One does not, however, reject one
theory in a vacuum, but only rejects it if a better one exists. HACKING, supra note 33,
at 79-81. If a statistical analysis reveals the chance of the experimental results occurring is very small, say 0.0001, there are two possible inferences one can make. Id. at
65, 83. One might attribute the low value to the observation theory, i.e., the statistical
and experimental methods; for example, the result could imply that the flips of the
coin in the preceding example were not independent. Id. at 83. Alternatively, one
might attribute it to the explanatory theory (the fairness of the coin) if independence
is well founded. In either case, a low statistical value merely shows that "if there is any
alternative hypothesis which will explain the occurrence of the sample with a more
reasonable probability, say 0.5 .. .you will be very much more inclined to consider
that the original hypothesis is not true." Id.
210 HACKING, supra note 12, at 213-15.
211 The experiment must be designed to ensure that the experimental observations are independent (i.e., each experimental test for toxicity is independent of the
others) and that systematic errors are minimized (e.g., randomization, double-blind
testing, etc.). See MAYO, supra note 23, at 4-7, 16-17.
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toxic effect). 2 12 In this scheme, the null hypothesis incorporates the
normal distribution as a model of the population (i.e., a human population insensitive to pesticide exposure) that the experiment is sampling; the experimental data are then compared against this
2 13
population model.
The null-hypothesis method leads to a counterintuitive result:
The probability calculated is not the probability that the pesticide is
harmful, but rather the probability of obtaining the experimental data
assuming the null hypothesis is true. 214 In the pesticide example, the
incidences of harm observed experimentally are compared against the
likelihood of that frequency of harm occurring if the pesticide had no
effect. As a result, a high probability of obtaining the experimental
results under the null-hypothesis model of the experiment implies "we
cannot tell which hypothesis is correct"-a different, untested hypothesis could have a higher probability. 2 15 Conversely, a low probability
indicates "the null hypothesis seems likely to be false." 2 16 In either
case, frequency-type statistical testing does not provide a straightforward assessment of the probability that the pesticide is harmful; it is
instead based on two measures of the null-hypothesis model's error
2 17
rates-significance and power.
212 HACKING, supra note 12, at 214. The relevant data for this test are the incidences of harm (e.g., carcinogenisis) among individuals exposed to the pesticide and
among those not exposed, generally referred to as the control group. Under the null
hypothesis, the two populations (exposed and unexposed) are assumed to have equal
incidences of harm.
213 Id.; see also Collins, supra note 30, at 335. The null hypothesis is a matter of
faith, not of logic or science, and thus is not an ultimate criterion of truth because
"[t]here is no way to test a statistical model statistically .... [Such an effort] leads only
to logical regress." Id. at 336. Moreover, while it makes sense that disparate causal
chains should be treated as completely independent, many gradations exist in between. As Keynes observed, "[a] remote connection or a reaction quantitatively small
is a matter of degree and not by any means the same thing as absolute independence." KEYNES, supra note 58, at 283. Other theorists have acknowledged the importance of "non-normal" distributions, particularly in heterogeneous systems, but these
efforts have been largely ignored. See PORTER, supra note 29, at 264-65, 307-10.
214 HACKING, supra note 12, at 214-15. In a 1986 article, Professor David H. Kaye
provided a very clear exposition of the confusion that often arises in the context of
legal actions over the meaning of statistical significance. See Kaye, supra note 187.
215 Parkhurst, supra note 201, at 1057.
216 Id. Stated otherwise, the statistical testing of the null-hypothesis model asks
the question: "Do we lack evidence that the [pesticide] is not safe ... ?" Id. at 1052.
Accordingly, interpreting failure to reject the null hypothesis as proof of its validity is
the "equivalent of failing to find a pair of pliers in a quick search of a messy garage
and claiming that failure to be good evidence that the pliers were not there." Id. at
1053.
217 HACKING, supra note 12, at 209-15, 223-25.
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The principle that underlies this approach is simple: "[T]here
should be very little chance of mistakenly rejecting a true hypothesis . . . [and] a good chance of rejecting false hypotheses."2 18 The
significance of a test is thus defined as the probability of rejecting the
null hypothesis when it is true (i.e., a Type I error). 2 19 Similarly, the
power of a test is defined as the probability of accepting the null hypothesis when it is false (i.e., a Type II error).22° Following this principle, the general rule is that experiments should have low significance
and high power.2 21 This rule is difficult to implement for two reasons.
First, it is often difficult to formulate an appropriate measure for
power, which leads investigators to ignore power altogether. 2 22 Second, an inherent tradeoff exists between minimizing significance and
maximizing power-the basic mathematics makes it impossible, as a
general rule, to minimize them simultaneously. 223 The term "significance test" is not arbitrary in this respect; it implies that traditional
frequentist testing focuses on statistical significance, not power.
Statisticians have responded to these constraints by adopting a
convention: They minimize only Type I errors and, where possible,
218
HACKING, supra note 33, at 92. This approach is referred to as the "NeymanPearson" theory, as it was first developed byJerzey Neyman and Egon S. Pearson. Karl
Popper's falsificationalism adopts an analogous approach to scientific testing using

frequency-type probability. See POPPER, supra note 121, at 198-205; Lakatos, supra

note 117, at 109 & n.6.
219

HACKING, supra note 12, at 212-13, 223-25; HACKING, supra note 33, at 92.

220 HACKING, supra note 12, at 224-25.
221 HACKING, supra note 12, at 225; HACKING, supra note 33, at 92-93.
222 See HACKING, supra note 12, at 224-25; Lehmann, supra note 201, at 1244-45;
McBride, supra note 28, at 19. If we return to the pesticide example, delimiting the
potential alternative hypothesis is far from straightforward. The alternative to "harmless" is not "harmful," it is actually a host of alternative hypotheses (and degrees of
potency) that entail some kind of harmful interaction. These problems arise for the
same reason that scientific inference generally is difficult: It is impossible to rule out
all possible alternative hypotheses. See supra Part II.B.; see also R. Lewin, Santa Rosalia
Was a Goat, 221 SCIENCE 636, 639 (1983) (providing an example of poor information
and theory for development of alternatives to the null-hypothesis model in ecological
science). Nevertheless, in certain well defined experiments these indeterminacies
can be minimized, and the power of an experiment may be reduced to a relatively
simple function of the sample size. MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 182-88 (2d ed. 2001); Dennis, supra note 23, at 1101.
223

See HACKING, supra note 12, at 224-25; HACKING, supra note 33, at 92-93. The

reason for this tradeoff becomes apparent if one considers the extreme cases of obtaining zero Type I or II error. If Type I errors were set at zero, the test would effectively reject the null hypothesis all the time, causing Type II errors to increase
substantially, and an analogous increase in Type I errors would occur if Type II errors
were set at zero. In between these extremes, a tradeoff exists between the two types of
errors and no general method exists for simultaneously minimizing them. Id.
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formulate a null hypothesis for which Type I errors are the more serious ones. 224 In practice, however, the starting hypothesis in a signifi-

cance test is by default a no-effect null hypothesis, meaning that the
Type I error being minimized in most statistical tests is identifying a
risk where none exists-not failing to discover a risk that is real. Following this convention, statistical tests are characterized by their "significance level" (i.e., Type I error rate), such that a test is "significant
at the one-percent level" when the null-hypothesis model of the experiment predicts that there is a 1% chance of observing the experimental result.225 More concretely, if a pesticide were, in fact, not harmful,

there would be only a 1% chance of observing the relative increase in
incidences of harm observed experimentally. Significance levels are
typically either 0.05 (95%) or 0.01 (99%) but, as suggested above,
these standard levels are neither driven by principle nor logical necessity.2 2 6 To the contrary, they represent an arbitrary rule established by
convention that early on was likely dictated by mathematical
simplicity.

227

Environmentalists focus on Type I and II error rates because the
no-effect null hypotheses used almost universally in significance testing are contrary to the Precautionary Principle. In the pesticide example, for instance, the starting hypothesis was that the pesticide was
harmless. This formulation fails to minimize the errors of greater
224

See MAYO, supra note 23, at 372-74; J. NEYMAN, FIRST COURSE IN PROBABILITY

AND STATISTICS 261-64 (1950).

225 HACKING, supra note 12, at 212-13. As such, "a hypothesis or significance test
determines whether an observed result is so unlikely to have occurred by chance
alone that it is reasonable to attribute the result to something else." Kaye, supra note
187, at 1333. More precisely, a 1% significance level means the following: "If a designated null hypothesis is true, then, using a certain statistic that summarizes information from an experiment like ours, the probability of obtaining the data that we
obtained, or less probable data, is 0.01." HACKING, supra note 12, at 215. In the absence of a conjectured theoretical model, significance testing takes on a mindless
quality because it amounts merely to finding that "[ e] ither the null hypothesis is true,
in which case something unusual has happened by chance (probability 1%), or the
null hypothesis is false." Id. at 243.
226 HACKING, supra note 12, at 216-18. Confidence limits, which are related to
significance but used for point estimates, often also employ 95% or 99% limits by
convention. A "confidence limit" of 95% represents the following: the point estimate
with which it is associated was made using a procedure that gives a correct estimate
95% of the time. Id. at 234-36, 240-41.
227 See Collins, supra note 30, at 337, 339; Kaye, supra note 187, at 1343-45; Lehmann, supra note 201, at 1244. The choice of 0.05 and 0.01 is at least partly a "mathematical accident" based on the normal distribution, for which "it is unusually easy to
compute the 99% and 95% accuracy probabilities for some phenomena." HACKING,
supra note 12, at 217.
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concern to environmentalists (i.e., failing to regulate when the pesticide is in fact harmful) because they are treated as Type II errors.
Environmentalists argue that asymmetries in the severity of Type I and
II errors can be corrected by relaxing a statistical test's significance
level, which they believe shifts the presumption away from the null
hypothesis and, in effect, lowers the burden of persuasion for finding
harm. 228 This reasoning illustrates two important misconceptions
about frequentist methods. First, it conflates the frequentist and Bayesian theories by interpreting the indirect statistical error rates of frequentist significance testing as Bayesian degree-of-belief
probability. 229 Second, it presumes that a simple relationship exists
between Type I and II errors.
Frequentist methods, as described above, employ null-hypothesis
error rates, not standards of proof. Thus, the proper interpretation of
228 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. For lawyers, the logic of this position appears self-evident, especially in light of longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence on burdens of persuasion. A good example of this is Justice Harlan's opinion
in In re Winship:
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of
erroneous outcomes. If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal
trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in
freeing guilty persons, but far greater risk of factual errors that result in
convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the
standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational
world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.
397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also David H. Kaye, Statistical
Significance and the Burden of Persuasion,46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at
13, 14-17.
229 D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion,
73 CORNELL L. RExv. 54, 57 (1987) (noting that the "unholy union" of frequency and
belief-type theories of probability leads to incoherence and "yields arbitrary and unjustifiable results").
The burden of persuasion [i.e., degree of reasonable belief] is . . . not the
likelihood that the effect found was due to random error. Using statistical
significance as the equivalent of the burden of persuasion is, as David Kaye
has trenchantly stated, like 'trying to find the shortest path from Oxford to
Cambridge by scrutinizing a map of London.'
Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 686
(1992); see also Kaye, supra note 228, at 21-23. Numerous examples of this confusion
exist. See, e.g., KS.

SHRADER-FRECHETrE, RISK AND RATIONALITY

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-

132-34 (1991); To Foresee and to Forestall, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 85, at 1, 3; Barrett &
Raffensperger, supra note 187, at 111-12; Cranor, supra note 187, at 79.
DATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS
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a significance test with a 95% significance level is not that failing the
test (i.e., being statistically significant) means the null hypothesis has a
95% chance of being false. Instead, meeting this error rate means
that the null-hypothesis model has less than a 5% chance of generating the observed data. In the pesticide example, the fact that the null
hypothesis has a low probability of predicting the experimental results
does not preclude it from being the most likely hypothesis-the experimental results could simply represent a rare event. 23 0 Interpret-

ing frequentist significance levels as quantifying the degree of support
for a hypothesis is equivalent to concluding that where A implies B it
necessarily follows that B implies A. Significance tests quantify how
likely a test hypothesis is to predict the observed data; they do not
quantify how well the observed data support a test hypothesis. Only
under certain limited circumstances may frequentist null-hypothesis
error rates be quantifiably related to a burden of persuasion and, even
where they can, the relationship is not a simple one in which unique
rates of Type I and II errors correspond to a specific burden of persuasion. 231 Typically, frequentist error rates will change from experi23 2
ment to experiment for a given burden of persuasion.
The effect of varying Type I and II errors must be carefully considered for several additional reasons. First, arguments regarding statistical error rates generally devolve into a rejection of conventional
significance levels with little or no consideration for how Type II errors are affected. While it is true that increasing the significance level
of a test lowers Type II errors, a simple one-to-one relationship does
230 The fact that a hypothesis explains observed data well does not necessarily imply that it is the most probable account. An exceedingly rare genetic disorder might
be consistent with certain observed symptoms, but if the symptoms also were reasonably consistent with a very common virus, a doctor will choose the latter in her diagnosis of the patient because it is so much more likely to occur. Similarly, the fact that a
hypothesis is only marginally consistent with experimental results does not necessarily
imply that it is not the most probable explanation. This is no different than if you
were to role double sixes five times consecutively in a game of backgammon. The
likelihood of this occurring with fair dice is exceedingly low, but if you have no other
reasons to believe that the dice are fixed, you could reasonably conclude that a remarkably rare event just occurred rather than that the dice are unfair. These examples involve what are often referred to as "base-rate" problems, one of which (the taxi
cab example) is discussed in detail in Part IV.A.
231 See Kaye, supra note 187, at 1355-56, 1362-63. Moreover, where multiple hypotheses are at issue, other analytical problems may arise. See David Kaye, The Limits
of the Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard:JustifiablyNaked StatisticalEvidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 508-13.
232 See M. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 373-82 (1975); Kaye, supra note
229, at 71-73; Kaye, supra note 228, at 17, 21-23.
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not exist between them. 2 33 The relationship between the two types of

errors is complicated by the fact that Type II error is determined by
several other independent factors, such as the size of the data set and
the background incidence of the phenomena being studied. 234 Second, indiscriminately raising the significance level of an experiment
can lead to perverse results: increased total experimental error (i.e.,
combined Type I and II errors) with only a marginal decrease in Type
II errors. 235 In such cases, statistical reliability is sacrificed without environmental concerns benefiting from a more rigorous vetting of the
data. 236 Precautionary Principle proponents must thus be careful in

how they relate significance levels to legal burdens of persuasion and
how they seek to balance perceived asymmetries between Type I and
II errors in a regulatory context. It is essential to understand that frequentist methods test hypotheses stringently; they do not quantify
their probability of being true directly. For frequentists, confidence
in a hypothesis instead accrues qualitatively through a hypothesis satisfying multiple tests.
B.

Equivalence Testing: A Direct Method for Minimizing Type II Errors of
Environmental Significance

The Precautionary Principle has undeniably helped to expose the
systemic bias in traditional significance testing methods, which employ, generally by default, a no-effect null hypothesis. One can disagree in specific cases whether an asymmetry exists between
underregulation and overregulation, but few people would deny that
233 See DEGROOT, supra note 232, at 275-78 (noting that a large increase in significance level may not have a marked effect on an experiment's power and, within a
certain range, may have little effect at all); Green, supra note 229, at 684-85.
234 See Green, supra note 229, at 685. As a general rule, experiments containing
larger statistical samples and studying phenomena with low background rates, or significant impacts, will have lower Type II error rates. A scientist, for example, studying
breast cancer deaths associated with an industrial chemical drawing on a patient population of ten thousand individuals will be in a much better position to discern an
effect than a scientist studying mild cognitive impairments from lead exposure with a
patient population of one hundred individuals.
235 See id. at 687-89; Kaye, supra note 229, at 66-73.
236 The challenges of controlling statistical power are demonstrated by scientists'
recent efforts to refocus attention on statistical power by undertaking post hoc power
analyses, under which statistical power is calculated using the experimental data as an
alternative to directly improving the statistical power of their experiments. While well
intentioned, this approach is analytically flawed and logically inconsistent for reasons
related to the interpretive problems discussed here. SeeJohn M. Hoenig & Dennis M.
Heisey, The Abuse ofPower: The PervasiveFallacy of Power Calculationsfor Data Analysis, 55
Am. STATISTICIAN 19, 19-21 (2001).
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in some situations underregulation poses the more serious risk of
harm. Fortunately, the apparent bias of frequentist methods is
neither necessary nor, as a historical matter, consistent with how significance testing was originally conceived. The statistician Jerzy
Neyman, one of the co-developers of modern significance testing, addressed the importance and meaning of Type I and II errors in his
1950 introductory text on statistics:
It is essential to notice there are two different kinds of errorpossible. The

adoption of [the null] hypothesis H when it is false is an error qualitatively different from the error consisting of rejecting H when it is
true. This distinction is very important because, with rare exceptions, the importance of the two errors is different, and this difference must be taken into consideration when selecting the
appropriate test....
As already mentioned, the situation where the consequences of
the two kinds of errors are of unequal importance is of a very general occurrence. It is true that in many cases the relative importance of the errors is a subjective matter . .

. .

However, this

subjective element lies outside of the theory of statistics. The essential point to notice is that, in most cases, the person applying a test
of a statistical hypothesis considers one of the possible errors more
important to avoid than the other....

Postulating this to be the ordinary case we will use the expression error of thefirst kind [i.e., Type I error] to describe that particular error in testing hypotheses which is considered more important
to avoid. The less important error will be called the error of the second kind [i.e., Type II error] ....

This convention of labeling the two kinds of error is supplemented by a parallel convention concerning the use of the term
hypothesis tested. Let H be a statistical hypothesis and H its negation.
The term hypothesis tested is attached to H or to H in such a way that the
237
rejection of the hypothesis tested when it is true is an error of thefirst kind.

Neyman carefully distinguished Type I and II errors because, as
discussed above, they cannot be jointly minimized. Accordingly, a
judgment must be made regarding the appropriate tradeoff between
the two types of error. 238 In significance testing, as Neyman indicates,
Type I errors are minimized first, that is they are given priority.
Neyman also made it clear, however, that the hypothesis tested and
237
238

supra note 224, at 261-64.
See supra Part III.A.
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Type I error are connected-minimizing the more important error
requires that the appropriate hypothesis be tested.
Addressing Type II errors in environmental science therefore
also entails formulating an appropriate null hypothesis to test. 239 In
the standard significance tests, the null hypothesis is either that no
effect exists or that an effect does not exceed a specific level, such as a
regulatory limit. 240 In these cases, the null-hypothesis model is constructed by positioning a normal distribution at the value in question
(i.e., zero or some other number). The Type I error then is the error
of obtaining a positive result that is false (e.g., regulating a chemical
that is nontoxic), which will result in the less important type of error
being minimized, if one either accepts the Precautionary Principle
generally or believes in the specific instance that underregulation
24 1
poses greater risks.
The bias of conventional frequentist significance testing is compounded by the common interpretive mistakes discussed earlier. Recall that significance testing supports one of two conclusions: either
(1) the null hypothesis is false or (2) the null hypothesis is not inconsistent with observed experimental data-from which one generally
cannot conclude that the null hypothesis is true. 24 2 Nevertheless,
many people assume that failure to falsify the null hypothesis (i.e.,
lack of statistical significance) implies that no effect exists. 243 This interpretive error, in effect, places the burden of proof on anyone wishing to refute the null hypothesis.
Equivalence testing uses a null hypothesis that resolves both of
these problems. 24 4 The typical null-hypothesis model of an experi239

Philip M. Dixon, Assessing Effect and No Effect with Equivalence Tests, in RISK AsLOGIC AND MEASUREMENT 275, 275-76 (Michael C. Newman & Carl L.

SESSMENT:

Strojan eds., 1998).
240 It is important to recognize that shifting the starting hypothesis to a nonzero
value, such that some degree of harm is assumed at the outset, does not get you very
far. In such cases, the test minimizes the error associated with finding, for example,
the chemical does not have the specific nonzero value when in fact it does. The error
minimized remains regulating when the nonzero harm does not actually exist, not
failing to regulate when the chemical is harmful. If there is significant uncertainty
about what the actual level is, minimizing the error associated with a discrete nonzero
value is not terribly effective. To be effective, the null hypothesis needs to encompass
a range of values all at once.
241

NEYmAN, supra note 224, at 275-76; Page, supra note 195, at 231-33.

242 See supra Part III.A.; Dixon, supra note 239, at 275-76.
243 Parkhurst, supra note 201, at 1053, 1055.
244 See Berger & Hsu, supra note 28, at 283-84; McBride, supra note 28, at 20-21;
Parkhurst, supra note 201, at 1053-54. The test described here is also sometimes
referred to as a "reverse equivalence test." See id., at 1054-56.
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ment, as discussed above, is based on a point estimate. Equivalence
tests replace the point estimate with an interval. A zero-valued point
estimate, for example, would be replaced by an interval of, say, magnitude 0.01, which would range from 0.00 to 0.01.245 Just like a point

estimate, an equivalence interval also can be used for nonzero values,
either bracketing them, +0.05, or extending to one side, x + 0.01.
The null hypothesis for an equivalence test is not "the chemical is
toxic." It is "the chemical's toxicity is equal to or greater than x,"
where the interval is 0 to x and the value x is presumably set by a
regulatory entity. 246 The conjectured hypothesis is "the chemical's
toxicity is less than X" 247 Because the null hypothesis assumes that the

chemical is harmful, equivalence tests minimize the "more important"
error, which here is the error of declaring the chemical harmless
when its toxicity is beyond the regulatory interval (i.e., erroneously
determining that the chemical should not be regulated).248 Similarly,
the interpretive mistakes discussed above err in favor of protecting the
environment and human health, which in this case is presumptively
the more important direction to err.
An additional virtue of equivalence testing is that it is a well established statistical method under governing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations. 249 Consistent with Neyman's reasoning, FDA
requires equivalence testing to ensure that the risk of allowing a harmful drug to be sold is minimized, i.e., the more serious error is controlled. Accordingly, given that the FDA is one of the most highly
regarded and scientifically sophisticated federal agencies, equivalence
testing should not raise problems from either a scientific or regulatory
standpoint. Moreover, while it is somewhat surprising that equivalence testing has not been used beyond the FDA, it does not derive
from inherent limitations of the methodology, which could be applied
in a broad range of environmental sciences. 250 Instead, it is likely that
245 See Dixon, supra note 239, at 276-77; McBride, supra note 28, 20-21.
246 See Berger & Hsu, supra note 28, at 283-84; Parkhurst, supra note 201, at 1054.
The example is admittedly oversimplified insofar as it suggests that toxicity can be
measured on a single metric. These complexities are not relevant here, as the central
point of the example is independent of considerations about processes for quantifying the data.
247 McBride, supra note 28, at 20-21.
248 Id.
249 See id.; Dixon, supra note 239, at 279. The FDA requires generic drug manufacturers to use equivalence testing to determine whether a generic drug is bioequivalent to an existing brand-name drug. See, e.g.,
FDA Bioavailability and
Bioequivalence Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 320 (2003).
250 Dixon, supra note 239, at 279; McBride, supra note 28, at 19-20, 23; Parkhurst,
supra note 201, at 1054-56.
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the arcane nature of statistical methods and general ignorance about
them simply obscured the relevance of equivalence testing to other
251
legal and regulatory areas.
Despite these important virtues, some environmentalists may nevertheless object to the use of equivalence intervals. 2 52 Specifically, the
interval from 0 to x described in the example above is, in effect, an
interval in which the chemical's (nonzero) toxicity is determined to
be de minimis.

25

3

If the toxicity of the chemical falls entirely within

the equivalence interval, the null hypothesis for the equivalence test
(i.e., that the chemical's toxicity is equal to or greater than x) is likely
false and the chemical will be considered safe; otherwise, the test is
inconclusive and the presumption remains that the chemical is harmful. The problem raised by the equivalence interval is that-like the
convention of using a 5% significance level-no objective basis exists
for determining its magnitude. 254 The size of the interval would presumably be set by the relevant agency, which is the current practice at
the FDA. 255 For some environmentalists, the specter of allowing federal agencies to establish a priori de minimis levels for industrial
chemicals will be grounds for rejecting the method, as de minimis
levels are contrary to the chemical risk models propounded by
2 56
environmentalists.
Such opposition would not be warranted. First, the significance
levels of traditional frequentist tests raise precisely the same problem,
just less transparently. In fact, many people consider statistical significance levels to be defined objectively when they are set by convention.
An equivalence interval, in contrast, would be established up front as
a matter of agency policy, not under the guise of arcane statistical
rules as significance levels are. 257 Second, and more importantly,

traditional significance testing methods lack the benefit derived from
shifting the de facto burden of proof to the regulated entity and minimizing the more environmentally significant type of error. Equivalence testing both rectifies the systemic bias in traditional significance
251 See, e.g., Hoenig & Heisey, supra note 236, at 23; Parkhurst, supra note 201, at
1056-57.
252 See Dixon, supra note 239, at 279 ("All equivalence tests force the user to specify some region of equivalence before the data are analyzed.").
253 See McBride, supra note 28, at 21-26; Parkhurst, supra note 201, at 1054.
254 Dixon, supra note 239, at 279; Parkhurst, supra note 201, at 1054.
255 See Berger & Hsu, supra note 28, at 284.
256 See BREYER, supranote 20, at 44-45; Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5,
at 1618-26.
257 Dixon, supra note 239, at 298.
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testing while at the same time making the judgments and conventions
25
in significance testing more transparent.
Decisions regarding the use of equivalence tests over traditional
methods will nevertheless remain contentious if the longstanding battle over the Precautionary Principle is at all representative. One can
only hope that the added flexibility equivalence testing offers will allow this debate to evolve, as it will afford direct comparisons between
traditional methods and a statistically valid alternative that is consistent with the Precautionary Principle.
C.

The Limits of FrequentistMethods and the PrecautionaryPrinciple

Equivalence testing is ultimately only a partial response to the dictates of the Precautionary Principle. Frequentist methods support inferences from discrete scientific studies (the second stage of our
framework) and are thus of limited value to integrated scientific determinations. 259 Consider an example in which the results of two experiments on a chemical's toxicity both satisfy a 95% significance level,
but their estimates of its toxicity differ markedly. Assume further that
one of the experiments involved dosing rats under controlled conditions, while the other was a human epidemiological study for which
exposure levels could not be controlled as stringently. These experimental differences prove critical because the data are not directly
comparable, i.e., they are not commensurable. Statistical significance
will be irrelevant to how a scientist weighs the credibility of the two
studies and integrates their results to estimate the chemical's toxicity.
To make an integrated (stage three) determination, a scientist undertakes a qualitative assessment of how well each experiment was designed and implemented. 26 ° Accordingly, while statistical significance
serves an important purpose, its role in rigorously testing hypotheses
(i.e., gatekeeper) is removed from the final, third-stage scientific
261
judgment.
This simplified example is directly applicable to the EPA's process for setting chemical toxicity levels under its Integrated Risk Infor258 McBride, supra note 28, at 26.
259 See HACKING, supra note 33, at 111-13 (observing that frequentist statistical
tests do not resolve the question of how stringent a test must be in a given context and
thus cannot, on their own, be used to determine whether to reject or accept a given
scientific theory); see also Green, supra note 229, at 693-94 (discussing problems with
judges and juries limiting scientific analysis to "simple [statistical] screening devices").
260 See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 82, at 33; MAYO, supra note 23, at 122-26;
Collins, supra note 30, at 336-37.
261 MAyo, supra note 23, at 375-77.
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mation System (IRIS) program. 26 2 IRIS toxicological reviews are
designed to generate a consensus opinion on the potency of the toxic
chemicals the EPA regulates. The IRIS process assesses all of the available toxicological studies performed on a chemical. 263 When integrating the available data to arrive at a consensus opinion, scientists
consider a variety of experimental factors, such as whether the data
are derived from animal or human studies, the degree to which the
conditions for the experiments were controlled, assumptions made to
determine exposure levels, and any confounding exposures that could
bias the results. 2 64 Statistical significance is independent of these considerations-even poorly crafted or weak experiments can generate
statistically significant results. 2 65 Thus, while a lower level of statistical

significance may permit scientists to consider more data, it provides
no guidance on the more important judgment of how the data are
assessed relative to each other or as a whole. 266 This point is critical

because scientific judgments on the value of specific experimental results "count most, not some meeting of, or failure to meet, an arbitrary level of statistical 'significance.'

"

26 7

The Precautionary Principle clearly is not limited to stage-two inferences from discrete experiments, or interpreted solely in terms of
relative error rates and frequentist significance testing. Although it is
often described in frequentist terms, the Precautionary Principle is
targeted at scientific judgment generally. 268 Indeed, advocates of the
Precautionary Principle consider its singular virtue to be that it is "imperfectly translatable into codes of conduct," and thus is resistant to
262 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, What is Iris?, at http://www.epa.gov/iris/intro.htm
(last updated July 8, 2003), for the EPA's description of the IRIS program.
263 A chemical's "reference dose" is the highest dose for which its toxic effects are
not observed, corrected for uncertainties in its derivation. The EPA uses potencies/
reference doses and modeling methods to calculate regulatory standards for each of
the chemicals it regulates. As such, the IRIS toxicological reviews provide the final
toxicological information used by the EPA to calculate regulatory standards for toxic
substances.
264 See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 20, at 43-44; Green, supra note 229, at 649-53;
Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra note 5, at 1621-27.
265 See supra Part II.C (noting that the early Mendelian and biometrics experiments are just two examples).
266 See MAYO, supra note 23, at 313 n.8 (noting that the exclusion of nonsignificant
results actually creates a bias in the scientific literature because negative results are
often not reported and thus not considered in meta-analyses of multiple experimental
studies); Collins, supra note 30, at 337.
267 See Collins, supra note 30, at 337.
268 See Barrett & Raffensperger, supra note 187, at 115-20; Jordan & O'Riordan,
supra note 188, at 16-19.
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expert co-option. 2 6 9 Formulated in this manner, however, the Precautionary Principle risks compromising legal and scientific procedures
by treating obscurantism as a virtue necessary to counteract expert
authority. The underlying premise is a familiar one, namely, that all
"research priorities, data, and conclusions are shaped by social contexts and values." 270 In short, because environmental science is qualified by uncertainties and thus subject to value judgments, the
2 71
Precautionary Principle should direct all scientific determinations.
Probably the most common criticism of the Precautionary Principle is that it risks advancing a model for scientific inference that lacks
both objective measures and quantitative clarity.2 72 This vagueness is
not, however, unique to the Precautionary Principle, but instead is a
general feature of efforts to formulate interpretive principles based on
broad fundamental principles or rights. 273 For conservative or procedurally oriented legal scholars, reliance on fundamental rights (e.g.,
269 Jordan & O'Riordan, supra note 188, at 15-16 (noting that the Precautionary
Principle does not have "much coherence other than it is captured by the spirit that is
challenging the authority of science, the hegemony of cost-benefit analysis, the
powerlessness of victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of
intrinsic natural rights and intergenerational equity").
270 Barrett & Raffensperger, supranote 187, at 116; see also R. Michael M'Gonigle,
The PoliticalEconomy of Precaution, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 85, at 123, 129-30.
271 The presumption that science is inseparable from social factors is a highly debatable one. See, e.g.,
GASKINS, supra note 83, at 161-62; LAUDAN, supra note 30, at
104, 201-02. The environmentalists' argument is a non-sequitur. Environmentalists
demonstrate the uncertainties in science and then employ these arguments to show
that values must fill the gaps. The problem is that they never demonstrate that the
choice is necessarily limited to either science or social values.
272 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the PrecautionaryPrinciple,
ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1991, at 4-5 (asserting that "the precautionary principle ... is
too vague to serve as a regulatory standard"); Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the
PrecautionaryPrinciple,288 SCIENCE 979, 979 (2000) (" [The Precautionary Principle's]
greatest problem, as a policy tool, is its extreme variability in interpretation."); Mark
Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis With The Principle That Safety Matters More
Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 174-76 (2001) ("The vagueness of the precautionary principle provides ample room for disagreement, making it hard to justify regulations based on the principle."); John Lemons et al., The Precautionary Principle:
Scientific Uncertainty and Type I and Type II Errors, 2 FOUND. SCIENCE 207, 210 (1997)
(claiming that the Precautionary Principle is not "concrete enough" to allow for consistent implementation); Sheila Jasanoff, A Living Legacy: The Precautionary Ideal in
American Law, in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY 227, 229 (Joel A. Tickner ed., 2003) ("Critics charge not only that [the Precautionary Principle] is too vague to be useful, but also that it rejects science and threatens
innovation.").
273 ELY, supra note 14, at 50 ("'[A]ll theories of natural law have a singular vagueness which is both an advantage and disadvantage in the application of the theories.'

2004]

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM

AND

RESTRAINT

privacy or equality) in judicial review exemplifies this kind of approach. 274 Objections to the Precautionary Principle do not differ in
substance from those raised in the judicial context: the Precautionary
Principle is used to guide scientific judgment just as fundamental
rights are used to resolve interpretive ambiguities in constitutions and
275
to guide judicial review generally.
The deficiencies of a rights-based, or natural law, approach to judicial review have been enumerated many times. John Hart Ely provides one of the most deft and clear critiques:
[T]he only propositions with a prayer of passing themselves off as
"natural law" are those so uselessly vague that no one will noticesomething along the "No one should needlessly inflict suffering"
line. "[A]I1 the many attempts to build a moral and political doctrine upon the conception of a universal human nature have
failed .... [They] are too few and abstract to give content to the
idea of the good, or they are too numerous and concrete to be truly
universal.
One has to choose between triviality and
2 76
implausibility."
The same uncertainties arise with the Precautionary Principle:
"While it is applauded as a 'good thing,' no one is quite sure about
what it really means, or how it might be implemented. '2 77 The challenges of applying the Precautionary Principle are in fact potentially
more acute, as environmental policymaking is already rendered difficult by the technical nature of the underlying scientific determinations. Moreover, insofar as proponents of the Precautionary Principle
accept as dogma that science is unavoidably infused with value judgments, the potential for science to resolve uncertainties will be under2 78
valued or ignored.
The advantage, one gathers, is that you can invoke natural law to support anything
you want. The disadvantage is that everybody understands that.") (citation omitted.).
274

Id. at 48-49.

275

SeeJordan & O'Riordan, supra note 188, at 16 (characterizing the Precaution-

ary Principle as implementing the "ethics of intrinsic natural rights and intergenerational equity"); Santillo et al., supra note 191, at 46 (noting that the Precautionary
Principle is "an overarching principle to guide decision making in the absence of
analytical or predictive certainty").
276

ELY, supra note 14, at 51-52 (citations omitted).

277 Jordan & O'Riordan, supra note 188, at 22 (noting that critics "claim its popularity derives from its vagueness").
278 See Barrett & Raffensperger, supra note 187, at 115 ("[R]esearch methods, theories, and empirical bases in ecology, as well as in more reductionist sciences, are
underdetermined. As a result, isolated scientific disciplines cannot provide a strong
basis for environmental policy."). See Part II.C for an opposing argument.
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The problem with this critique is that it also applies to science.
As Kuhn and others have shown, science consists of a mix of rigorous
techniques and broad principles. Kuhn refers to the balance between
them as "the essential tension" in good science. 2 79 These broad scientific principles (e.g., simplicity, consistency, and breadth) are not demonstrably more or less vague than the Precautionary Principle.
Scientists, for example, seek to elaborate theories that are both internally consistent and consistent with existing data, but this ideal is
fraught with uncertainties and ad hoc qualifications because no scientific theory is ever without contrary data. 280 Consistency thus becomes
a matter of degree, but developing a coherent measure is complicated
by the fact that competing theories will be consistent with different
data. The different empirical support for competing theories makes it
far more difficult to ascertain which of them is the "more consistent"
because one ends up having to make judgments that amount to comparing apples and oranges. Objecting to the Precautionary Principle
because of its vagueness is therefore self-defeating, for it implicitly
condemns established scientific principles as well.
The basic sentiment behind the Precautionary Principle-consideration of the nature, uncertainties, and potential magnitude of the
risks implicated in a scientific analysis-is not inherently antiscientific.
Established scientific methods like statistical significance (and equivalence) testing, for example, contemplate a precautionary approach
that considers the risks at issue in an experimental study. 28 1 Many
advocates of the Precautionary Principle, however, have much more
grandiose objectives, such as curing science of its reductionist bias and
democratizing how science is practiced. 28 2 Indeed, some "strong con279
280
281

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.B.

282 See Barrett & Raffensperger, supra note 187, at 115-17 ("In the precautionary
model, scientists act as co-problem solvers in a broad community of peers. This community extends not only beyond the boundaries of individual disciplines but also beyond the traditional boundaries of the scientific community."); Joel A. Tickner, The
Role of Environmental Science in PrecautionaryDecision Making, in PRECAUTION, ENVIRON-

supra note 272, at 3, 16 ("To support precautionary decision making, the current fragmentation and narrow focus of
science and policy will need to be dissolved, allowing a much broader framing and
examination of questions."). It is worth remembering that Thomas Kuhn's theory of
science was not an endorsement of scientific relativism. Kuhn's belief in science was
grounded in the workings of normal science, which is an expert-community model,
not a fully democratic one. See supra Part II.B. Kuhn understood that the singular
virtue of science is that it sometimes does generate methods for objectively substantiating facts-despite universal theories remaining elusive. Id.
MENTAL SCIENCE AND PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY,
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ceptions" of the Precautionary Principle restrict scientists to "a very
limited role in decision making." 2 3 These stronger versions of the
Precautionary Principle raise more difficult questions insofar as they
propose radical departures from existing scientific methods and
processes. The heavy ideological baggage that often attends the Precautionary Principle provides further grounds for being circumspect. 2 84 As in the balancing of scientific and political processes

described in Part II.B, important tradeoffs exist between maintaining
the integrity of scientific processes and addressing the objectives of
these stronger versions of the Precautionary Principle.
The Precautionary Principle is a prominent example of how the
public, lawyers, and scientists are struggling to define the appropriate
scope of their respective roles in environmental policymaking. Part II
of this Article focused on scientific methods and regulatory models
relevant to stage-one quantitative judgments. This Part has discussed
some of the limits of scientific methods by exploring important sys-

temic biases and interpretive constraints found in frequentist statistical methods. I have proposed equivalence testing as a technical
response to the bias of traditional frequentist methods, but it cannot
address the subsequent stage-three judgments that ultimately must be
made. Because significance testing does not quantify directly the
probability that a hypothesis is valid, qualitative judgnents-not quantitative assessments-of the support for a hypothesis must be made
following a finding of statistical significance. The need for, and difficulty of making, these qualitative judgments is central to Bayesian criticisms of frequentist methods. Bayesian methods offer an alternative
methodological approach to defining, and arguably broadening, the
role of scientific expertise in environmental policy.
IV.

FREQUENTIST AND BAYESIAN METHODS: COMPETING MODELS FOR
INTEGRATING EXPERT JUDGMENT INTO
ENVIRONMENTAL

SCIENCE

This final Part brings together the scientific and legal debates. It
begins with a discussion of the opposing Bayesian and frequentist positions advocated by scientists, drawing initially on the models proposed by Breyer and Wagner, respectively. Part IV.A then provides a
brief introduction to Bayesian methods, which is followed by a critique and more detailed comparison of frequentist and Bayesian
methods in Part IV.B. The legal debate reenters the discussion in Part
IV.C, where I propose a model for structuring scientific judgment that
283 Jordan & O'Riordan, supra note 188, at 25, 30-31.
284

See id.
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exploits the parallels between the competing scientific and legal
frameworks. However, the scientific and legal debates differ in one
critical respect: the dispute among scientists is not divisible into the
traditional antiregulatory and pro-environment political camps. Well
known environmental scientists, for example, are ardent advocates of
Bayesian methods, which complement the expert model of environmental decisionmaking advocated by Breyer and uniformly criticized
by environmentalists. This undercutting of the existing political divisions is part of the appeal of linking the legal and scientific debates.
The dispute among scientists over Bayesian and frequentist methods can be understood through the lens of the proposals advocated by
Justice Breyer and Professor Wagner discussed in Part II. Like the
scientists debating statistical methods, both Breyer and Wagner are
concerned about the proper role of scientific judgment in drawing
inferences from limited scientific information. Breyer adopts a Bayesian approach by delegating broad authority to scientific experts for
setting administrative standards and regulations. As described in Part
I, Bayesian methods require that expert judgment be quantified and
integrated directly into the analysis-the starting point for all Bayesian analyses is a judgment about the relative probability of the hypotheses being evaluated. Bayesians do not fixate on objective
experimental methods, but opt instead to ground their methods on
expertise and logical rules. 285 Like Breyer, Bayesians do not attempt

to distinguish science from policy; Bayesian methods seamlessly mix
judgment and experimental data together to derive the conditional
probability (i.e., conditional on data and judgment) that a hypothesis
is true.
Wagner's approach is frequentist in its procedural detail, commitment to transparency, and skepticism about expert judgment. Recall
that the centerpiece of Wagner's proposal was requiring agency experts to distinguish the science from the trans-science, or science from
policyjudgments. 2 8 6 While frequentism does not distinguish between
science and trans-science, it adopts an analogous approach by separating the formal statistical analysis of experimental data from scientific
judgment, that is stages two and three of the framework discussed in
the Introduction to this Article. 287 However, neither Wagner nor fre285
286

See supra Part I; infra Part IV.A.
See supra Part II.A.

287 Frequentism is not simply a collection of mathematical techniques for analyzing data; it incorporates a philosophy of scientific method similar to Popper's critical
mode of inquiry. See MAYO, supra note 23, at 13-17; Dennis, supra note 23, at 1100.
However, instead of developing severe tests for particular hypotheses, frequentists
have adopted a set of experimental rules (e.g., randomization, control groups, 95%
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quentism denies the importance of scientific judgment. Both instead
adopt formal procedures for separating objective inferences from subjective judgments. Frequentism accomplishes this by quantifying how
well a test hypothesis predicts experimentally observed results, which
scientists use, along with a variety of qualitative factors, to judge the
validity of their test hypothesis. Wagner, however, does not propose
an analytic framework, but, somewhat circularly, relies on the judgment of scientific experts and judges to distinguish science from policy. Nevertheless, Wagner's proposal and frequentist methods share
the same philosophy: Objective facts should be separated from subjective judgments to maximize the transparency and verifiability of the
determinations.
The debate among environmental scientists over frequentist and
Bayesian methods is hotly contested and intensifying. Frequentists object to Bayesian techniques because they do not adhere to frequentist
conceptions of proper scientific methods. Frequentists warn that:
[Environmental scientists] should be aware that Bayesian methods
constitute a radically different way of doing science .... Bayesians
categorically reject various tenets of statistics and the scientific
method that are currently widely accepted in ecology and other sciences. The Bayesian approach has split the statistics world into warring factions . . . and it is fair to say that the Bayesian approach is
288
growing rapidly in influence.
Frequentists, as it turns out, have good reason to fear that Bayesian methods will become more important in environmental sci-

significance levels) to ensure that tests are severe and transparent. See MAYO, supra
note 23, at 4-7, 12-13, 16-17. Frequentist experiments also are designed to minimize
Popper's problem with auxiliary hypotheses by "isolat[ing] the effect of interest so
that only a manageable number of causal factors (or types of factors) may produce
the particular experimental outcome." Id. at 15. These rules provide standard methodological tools that ensure experiments are adequately controlled. Scientific objectivity is maximized by limiting scientific bias and making error rates a critical measure
of scientific validity. Frequentists use statistical error as a basis for accepting experimental results "'because they are confident that error ramifies. If the hypotheses that
they are accepting in order to attack new problems are mistaken, the results of related, though partially independent, research are likely to signal that something is
wrong."' Id. at 41-42 (quoting DAVID HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY

(1988)). Frequentists seek to minimize bias by "remov[ing] the scientist's beliefs from the conclusions as much as possible and let[ting] the data do the talking." Dennis, supra note
23, at 1100.
288 Dennis, supra note 23, at 1095.
ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE
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ence. 28 9 It was not until new computational methods became
available in the late 1980s that Bayesian methods began to receive significant attention from environmental scientists, 290 and packaged programs made available through new computational methods are
29 1
making Bayesian methods increasingly accessible.
Bayesian advocates are no less committed to their approach and
its significance to environmental science. 292 They argue that it is absurd to assume that policymakers will have the expertise necessary to
interpret frequentist statistics, which require a detailed understanding
of the experimental methods and science to determine the weight experimental findings should be accorded. 29 3 " A frequentist working on
global change research, for example, would be limited to supplying
policymakers with statistically significant results on one or more scenarios for global warming, each of which would be supported by a multiplicity of experimental and observational data. Moreover, pursuant to
the frequentist philosophy of letting the data tell the story, the scientist would not indicate which of the scenarios he or she believes is the
most probable; this judgment would be left to the policymaker. In
contrast, a Bayesian analysis would generate relative probabilities for
each of the scenarios based on expert judgment and the available
data. Policymakers could inquire about and challenge the methods
used and bases for the scientific judgments, but would not be required
to interpret the data de novo.
Bayesians challenge the viability of frequentist methods in environmental science and laud the clarity of Bayesian results:
Serious doubts have been raised about the utility of abstract, general theories that have been shown repeatedly to have little predictive value in field or laboratory situations ....
Bayesian statistical
inference can be used to estimate ecologically meaningful parameters and provides an explicit expression of the amount of uncer2 94
tainty in these parameter estimates.
The essence of this debate turns on two practical concerns: the
credibility of science, which frequentist fear is compromised by Baye289

See Malakoff, supra note 23, at 1460-61 (noting that using the Bayesian

method enables researchers to achieve results not easily obtainable using the frequen-

tist method).
290 Brian Dennis, Statistics and the Scientific Method in Ecology, in THE NATURE OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (M.L. Taper & S.R. Lele eds., forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at
20, on file with author).
291 Malakoff, supra note 23, at 1460-61.
292 See Schneider, supra note 23, at 18.
293 See id. at 18-19.
294 Ellison, supra note 23, at 1036-37.
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sian methods; 295 and the ability of environmental science to provide
meaningful information for policymakers, which Bayesians fear frequentist methods preclude. 296 It also involves two competing models
of science: the Bayesian model structured around preliminary scientific judgments and logical rules, and the frequentist approach premised on rigorous testing and an objectivist approach to statistical
analysis.
Bayesians have encountered significant opposition from environmental scientists who believe that Bayesian methods threaten the objectivity of environmental science by incorporating subjective
judgments. The issue at the center of this dispute is the normative
authority of environmental science, particularly as it pertains to environmental policymaking. Frequentists believe the authority of environmental science depends on its objective credentials; Bayesians
assume that it is derivative of the good judgment of scientists themselves. To urge the acceptance of Bayesian methods in environmental
science, Bayesians rely on two central arguments: (1) Bayesian methods generate objective results because scientists' estimates converge as
more evidence is collected, and (2) frequentist methods are ill suited
to the needs and constraints of environmental science and policy.
These arguments will be discussed following a brief explanation of
Bayesian methods. This Part concludes by proposing a new model for
effectively integrating scientific judgment into environmental
policymaking.
A.

Bayesian StatisticalInference in Practice

The foundational principle of Bayesian, or belief-type, probability
is that information should be incorporated into decisionmaking pursuant to the logic of Bayes's theorem. 297 Reverend Thomas Bayes's
approach to statistical inference is particularly novel because it can be
applied even when one begins with no information about the probable outcomes of a decision. If I have several competing hypotheses
about the toxicity of a chemical (e.g., the chemical is benign, harmful
only at high doses, or harmful at any level of exposure) but no starting
data, Bayes postulated, in effect, a Cartesian starting point from which
295 See Dennis, supra note 23, at 1099-100 ("I object to calling [Bayesian estimates] science. Science is not about decisions; science is about making convincing
conclusions .... [T]he Bayesian philosophy of science is scientific relativism.").
296 Ellison, supra note 23, at 1036-38.
297 HACKING, supra note 12, at 172-77. The principal question for Bayesian analysis "is whether we are reasonable in modifying these opinions in the light of new
experience, new evidence." Id. at 256-57.
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to incorporate inductively new information and to infer logically
which of the competing hypotheses is most probable. 298 Bayesian theorists view probability in two distinct ways, logically and subjectively. 299
The two theories will be treated together because they draw on the
same principles and methods.
A crucial aspect of Bayesian methods is the initial scientific judgment from which the analysis starts. This judgment reflects a scientist's understanding of the system being studied and must be reduced
to a "prior distribution," which represents the distribution of
probabilities assigned to the set of hypotheses or events being considered. 300 The prior distribution, for example, of a coin assumed to be
298 It should also be noted that frequency-type information is routinely used as a
basis for belief-type probability. Id. at 137.
299 Id. at 146-47. Logical belief-type probability is defined objectively in terms of
logical relations between evidence and propositions, such that a proposition's
probability is evaluated relative to the available evidence. Id. at 142-43; Ian Hacking,
The Theory of ProbableInference: Neyman, Peirce and Braithewaite, in SCIENCE, BELIEF AND
BEHAVIOUR 141, 142-44 (D.H. Mellor ed., 1980). Restated more formally, "any body
of evidence e uniquely determines a probability for any hypothesis h," such that c(he)
= degree to which e confirms h. HACKING, supra note 32, at 148. This approach has a
distinctly legal character, having been variously described as the degree of reasonable
belief in or credibility of a proposition conditioned on the available evidence. See
HACKING, supranote 33, at 190-91, 194, 202; HACKING, supra note 32, at 13, 43, 85-87,
134-36.
By contrast, subjective belief-type theorists define probability as a subjective estimate of the likelihood that an event will occur or theory is true. See HACKING, supra
note 33, at 148, 208-09, 213-14. This radically subjective approach presumes that
individuals arrive at personal estimates on whatever bases they choose. See id. at 190,
194. Subjectivism denies (in a variant of idealism) that probability exists as a property
independent of individual subjective consciousness, and in so doing purports to avoid
Hume's induction problem. HACKING, supra note 12, at 256-60; MUSGRAVE, supra
note 116, at 146-47. Accordingly, where the logical theory turns on evidentiary support, the subjective theory considers "betting rates" (i.e., individual judgments constitute the relevant data) to resolve personal estimates regarding an event or hypothesis.
See HACKING, supranote 33, at 191-93, 202. If a person is "rational," his betting rates
will satisfy the logical axioms of belief-type probability theory. See id. at 208-09. The
central rule is the following: "The probabilityof any event is the ratio between the value
at which an expectation depending upon the happening of the event ought to be
computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening." Id. at 192. The
probability, P(*), of an event is defined in the following terms: P(*) = [contingent expectationvalue of a thing ('fairstake")] / [value of the thing expected when it occurs ("prize")]. Id.
at 192-94. The "fairbetting rate" =fair stake/prize = P(E), where E is a contingent event

upon which the expectation is based. Id. Subjectivists assume that a fair betting rate
is independent of the prize's size-i.e., that the relations are mathematically linear.
See id. at 96-97.
300 HACKING, supra note 12, at 173-74. A prior distribution may involve two hypotheses or events (e.g., a chemical is either harmful or not) or a number of them
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fair would distribute the total probability evenly between heads and
tails, i.e., 50% for a toss coming up heads and 50% for tails. A prior
distribution also may be a continuous function and can take on a wide
variety of mathematical forms-although, more complex distributions
may complicate Bayesian calculations. The prior distribution, for instance, of a chemical's toxicity could be a simple normal distribution
centered around the toxicity level a scientist believes is the most probable. Where a prior distribution is well circumscribed by existing scientific knowledge, judgments about it will likely be relatively
consistent and uncontested. As a practical matter, however, scientists
often differ substantially in their judgments (influenced by personal
biases or specific experiences) regarding the appropriate prior distribution for a specific system. 3 0' The discussion that follows begins with
a brief explanation of Bayes's theorem and then turns to Bayes's postulate and the strengths and limitations of the Bayesian approach.
1. Derivation and Logic of Bayes's Theorem
Bayes's theorem is the unifying logical formula that governs Bayesian statistical inference. 30 2 The derivation of Bayes's theorem follows
directly from the three fundamental axioms of probability theory and
the definition of "conditional probability. '30 3 For Bayes's theorem to
(e.g., a chemical is benign, it has a threshold below which it is not harmful, it is
harmful and harm increases linearly with exposure, or it is harmful and harm increases exponentially with exposure) depending on the circumstances.
301 See MAYO, supranote 23, at 75-77, 119-20. For example, a toxicologist working
for a pesticide manufacturer is likely to have a very different understanding of an
industrial chemical's biological activity than a toxicologist working for an environmental organization, and this understanding will be reflected in their judgment about
a prior distribution.
302 See HACKING, supra note 33, at 190.
303 See supra note 33. Conditional probability is the probability of an event conditioned on another event occurring, such as the likelihood of rain under certain atmospheric conditions. HACKING, supra note 33, at 14, 59. The probability of A
occurring conditioned on the occurrence of B, that is P(A / B), is defined to be
P(A&B) / P(B). See id. at 127. Conditional probability satisfies Kolmogoroff's first axiom, 0 < P(A / B) < 1, because the probability of B and A occurring cannot exceed the
probability of B occurring on its own. The conditional probability of A relative to B,
P(A / B), is thus defined as the probability of A and B occurring together, "normalized" (i.e., transformed onto a scale from 0 to 1) relative to the probability of B occurring on its own.
The definition of conditional probability also implies that P(A) = P(B)P(A / B) +
P(-B)P(A / -B), where -B is defined as B does not occur. For hypotheses A and B
that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the derivation is as follows: First, it follows
from A and B being mutually exclusive and exhaustive that P(A) = P(A&B) + P(A +
-B)--all cases of A occurring are covered by circumstance under which either B oc-
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apply, however, the hypotheses being evaluated must satisfy two conditions: first, they must be mutually exclusive, meaning only one hypothesis can be true or only one event may occur; second, they must be
jointly exhaustive, meaning one of the hypotheses must be true or one
event must occur.3 0 4 Bayes's theorem states that the probability of a
hypothesis H, such as it will rain today, conditioned on an event E,
such as news of diminishing barometric pressure, is simply the
probability of H prior to the new information, P(H), multiplied by the
"likelihood" of observing E if H is true.3 0 5 Bayes's theorem has the
following general form:
P(HJ / E) = P(H)P(E/ 1J) / [XP(HJP(E / H,)], for any set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses H 1, H 2, H 3 ... , Hk, where
P(H) > 0 for each i and P(E)

>

0.

3 6
0

The logical appeal and elegance of Bayes's theorem are apparent
in the following standard example.30 7 Assume you have been selected
to be a juror in a case in which the plaintiffs car was sideswiped by
another car on a misty winter night. The sole witness to the collision
claims she observed a blue cab collide with the plaintiff's car and then
drive off. You also learn that there are only two taxi companies in the
town, Green Cabs, Ltd., which owns only green cabs and operates 85%
of the cabs in town, and Blue Taxi, Inc., which owns only blue cabs
and operates 15% of the cabs in town. Finally, you are informed that
the witness selected the correct color of car, whether green or blue,
80% of the time when tested under conditions similar to those during
curs or B does not occur. Using the definition of conditional probability, substitute
P(A / B)P(B) and P(A / -B)P(-B) for P(A&B) and P(A + -B), respectively, to obtain
P(A) = P(B)P(A / B) + P(-B)P(A / -B), also known as the rule of total probability. For
any mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of hypothesis H,, H, H3, . •., HA for which
P(H) > 0 for each i, this rule generalizes as follows: P(Hi) = YP(HI)P(E / H).
304 HACKING, supra note 12, at 70.
305 See HACKING, supra note 33, at 190-91.
306 EARMAN, supra note 31, at 33-35. The derivation is relatively straightforward:
Starting with P(H + E) = P(E + H), multiply the left side by P(E) / P(E) and the right
side by P(H)/ P(H) to obtain P(H + E)P(E) / P(E) = P(E + H) P(H)/ P(H). Next, using
the definition of conditional probability, substitute P(H / E) for P(H + E) / P(E) on the
left side and P(E/ H) for P(E + H) / P(H)on the right side to obtain P(H / E)P(E) = P(E
/ H)P(E), which becomes P(H / E) = P(E / H)P(E) / P(E). Finally, using the rule of total
probability substitute P(H)P(E/ H) + P(-H)P(E / -H) for P(E) to obtain Bayes's theorem for the simplest system of a binary set of exhaustive hypothesis (e.g., a coin is fair
or unfair): P(H / E) = P(E / H)P(E)/ [ P(H)P(E / H) + P(-H)P(E / -H)]. Bayes's theorem generalizes as follows: P(H / E) = P(Hj)P(E / Hj) / [XP(Hi)P(E / Hi)], for any set of
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses H1, H2, H3 ... , Hk for which P(H) > 0
for each i and where P(E) > 0. HACKING, supra note 12, at 58-62, 70.
307 HACKING, supra note 12, at 72-73.
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the night of the accident. As a juror, you want to determine the
probability that the witness's account of the collision is correct.
Bayes's theorem may be used to integrate this information. Assuming that the car involved was a cab, the mutually exclusive and
exhaustive set of scenarios (hypotheses) are that the cab was blue, B,
or that the cab was green, G. In this example, you are given the prior
distribution, namely, the relative likelihoods of randomly encountering a green cab, P(G), and a blue cab, P(B), which are 0.85 and 0.15,
respectively. In addition, you know the probability that the witness's
observation is correct, P(Wb / B), is 0.80 (implying that P(W / G) =
0.20), where Wb identifies the witness as observing a blue cab. Bayes's
theorem may be used to determine the probability of the cab being
blue based on the witness's statement as follows:
P(B / W) = P(B)P(Wb / B) / [P(B)P(Wb / B) + P(G)P(Wb / G)]
(0.15 x 0.8) / [(0.15 x 0.8) + (0.85 x 0.2)] = 0.41
P(B / W) = 0.41
P(G / Wb) = 1 - P(B / W1) = 1 - 0.41 = 0.59
The determination that it is more likely that the cab is green
(59% probability) than blue (41% probability) is counterintuitive for
many people. The result, however, follows directly from the fact that
85% of the cabs on the road are green. The significance of the relative numbers of blue and green cabs becomes evident if you consider
it in the context of testing the witness's observational accuracy. Assume that this testing required the witness to make one hundred observations. Based on the relative numbers of green and blue cabs,
approximately eighty-five of the observed cabs are green and fifteen
blue. The witness's observations, however, are correct only 80% of the
time, implying that of the eighty-five green cabs, she observes about
sixty-eight as green and about seventeen as blue, and of the fifteen
blue cabs, she observes about twelve as blue and about three as green.
Adding these results together, the witness therefore observes twentynine cabs as blue, but only twelve (or about 41%) of the cabs are in
fact blue. In this example, the relative numbers of the blue and green
cabs offset the relatively high accuracy of the witness.
The cab example involves a very simple system for application of
Bayes's theorem. It satisfies precisely the basic requirements for
Bayes's theorem to hold: the potential options are mutually exclusive,
cabs are blue or green (not both), and exhaustive, each cab is either
blue or green (not some other color) .308 Perhaps most importantly,
308 This analysis implicitly rejects (i.e., sets their probabilities at zero) other hypotheses, such as that the defendant's car was not a cab, thereby irreversibly excluding them from the analysis.
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the prior distribution is provided by the data, obviating any need for
judgment by the juror. Few, if any, real world situations neatly meet
these conditions.3 0 9 In particular, as Popper demonstrated, scientists
cannot be certain that their set of hypotheses is complete. 310 These
epistemic limits necessitate that a number of conventional rules be
employed to resolve uncertainties and to make Bayes's theorem workable. 3 1 1 The next subsection discusses Bayes's postulate and the limits

of Bayesian analysis when confronted with such practical constraints.
2.

Bayes's Postulate and the Limits of Bayesian Analysis

According to Bayes's postulate, Bayes's theorem may be used to
incorporate experimental evidence inductively and to infer the relative probabilities of any set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses or

events.

312

When

starting

with

near or complete

ignorance, Bayes determined that a uniform prior distribution, meaning all hypotheses or events are given the same starting probability,
should be used.3 1 3 This strategy is analogous to assigning a one-sixth

probability to each face of a die when no basis exists to believe that
the die favors one side over another. For a variety of reasons, Bayesians are criticized for their reliance on such uniform distributions as
a justifiable starting point for Bayesian analysis. 3 14 More importantly,
even where information exists, scientists often have divergent views on
what the prior distribution should be. Take the example of a Bayesian
analysis of contaminant levels in a river. An environmentalist would
likely adopt a precautionary approach by assuming, for instance, that
supra note 31, at 140-41, 148-49.
See supra Part II.B.; HACKING, supranote 33, at 223-25. Moreover, for subjectivists, it is not at all clear what it means to "bet" on a hypothesis, which in all but the
most trivial cases will not be conclusively verifiable. See id. at 215.
311 Among the most important conventions is the assumption of linear scaling,
which ignores certain indeterminacies in choosing different scales and runs contrary
to economic and sociological data. See EARMAN, supra note 31, at 17; HACKING, supra
note 33, at 171-72, 199-201, 210; MAYO, supra note 23, at 90.
312 It is worth noting that, despite the dubious status of positivism, Bayes's postulate is based on a positivist approach to scientific progress. SeeEARMAN, supra note 31,
at 63-64.
313 See HACKING, supra note 12, at 70, 141-44; HACKING, supra note 33, at 200-06.
314 See HACKING, supra note 33, at 202-04, 208-10; MAYO, supra note 23, at 75-76,
83-85. A common criticism, for example, is that such uniform distributions are arbitrary in their choice of how the data are scaled, such that a uniform distribution in
one coordinate system or scale may be highly nonuniform in a different one. See
HACKING, supra note 33, at 202-04, 208. Certain theorists, most notably Ronald A.
Fisher, deplored Bayesians' overreliance on starting uniform distributions. See MAGKENZIE, supra note 160, at 208-10.
309

310

EARMAN,

200 4 ]

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVISM

AND

RESTRAINT

the contaminants do not biodegrade rapidly, that they are not sequestered, and that river flow dynamics cause them to concentrate in certain areas. Industry scientists, in contrast, would likely begin with a
very different, less conservative set of assumptions to construct their
prior distributions. These kinds of subjective judgments are intrinsic
to Bayesian methods, and they cause scientists with different perspectives to arrive at different starting prior distributions.
Bayesians have a simple response to such concerns: The starting
distribution is irrelevant because Bayesian analyses converge to the
3 15
most probable hypothesis irrespective of the starting distribution.
In its fully idealized form, Bayes's theorem, according to its proponents, operates as follows:
It is of fundamental importance to any deep appreciation of the
Bayesian viewpoint to realize that the particular form of the prior
distribution expressing beliefs held before the experiment is conducted is not a crucial matter ....
For the Bayesian, concerned as
he is to deal with the real world of ordinary and scientific experience, the existence of a systematic method for reaching agreement
is important. . . . The well-designed experiment is one that will
swamp divergent prior distributions with the clarity and sharpness
of its results, and thereby render insignificant the diversity of prior
16
opinion.3
Bayesians in essence claim that given sufficient data, Bayes's theorem will produce objective results that are independent of initial estimates of the probabilities for a set of starting hypotheses. It achieves
this objectivity by causing expert opinion to converge as more data are
collected, meaning at some point Bayesian assessments of any group
of experts would derive the same most-probable hypothesis. Thus, an
environmentalist and industry scientist may start with divergent estimates of contaminant levels, but once sufficient data are collected,
their estimates will converge to the same value.
A relatively simple example of how Bayesian analysis is applied in
environmental science suggests that such convergence is far from
guaranteed and that prior distributions generally cannot be ignored.
Assume that a river is found to have been contaminated with copper
from an industrial plant and that ten samples with a mean value of
50.6 microgram/liter (pg/l) and variance of 25.0 pg/1 have been col315
316

supra note 31, at 57-58, 141-42.
Patrick Suppes, A Bayesian Approach to the Paradoxesof the Ravens, in ASPECTS OF
INDUCTIVE LOGIC 198, 204 (Jaakko Hintikka ed., 1966); see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra
note 82, at 121-24 ("In Bayesian terms: Prior probabilities (that is, initial guesses)
play smaller and smaller roles as new evidence accumulates.").
EARmAN,
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lected to test the concentration of copper in the water. 3 17 Bayesian
methods can be used to determine the probability that the mean concentration of copper in the river exceeds a federal regulatory standard
of, say, 46 pag/l.
To begin the analysis, the scientist, whom we will assume is an
employee of the plant, would specify a prior distribution delineating
the probabilities of a continuous range of mean copper concentrations in the river. 3 18 For simplicity, we will assume that the scientist
judges that the prior distribution, P(H) above, is a normal distribution
with a variance of 4 pg/1 centered around a mean copper concentration of 20 pg/l (i.e., a low estimate with a narrow spread of values).319
The scientist would then use Bayes's theorem to combine the sample
data with his prior distribution, which here would generate a most
probable mean concentration of -36.1 pg/1. 320 Analogous to the cab
example, the prior distribution in this case offsets the much higher
observed values and leads to a prediction that the federal standard is
not violated. 32 1 Further, if another scientist were to start with a prior
distribution much closer to the sample value, convergence of the two
estimates would not be attained even with a significant increase in the
quantity of data-convergence is purely speculative. 3 22
The water sampling example demonstrates that where a disparity
exists between a scientist's prior distribution and observed values,
which may occur where data are of unknown quality, the prior distribution will dominate the final result if data are limited. Accordingly,
the claim that well designed experiments will ensure that divergent
assessments of competing hypotheses will converge appears empty. It
317 Dennis, supra note 290 (manuscript at 6-7).
318 Id. (manuscript at 15-16). The prior distribution need not be a normal distribution; its use here is solely to simplify the example.
319 Id. (manuscript at 15). Unlike the cab example, the prior distribution in this
case is continuous across a range of potential contaminant levels, such that each contaminant level encompassed by the normal distribution constitutes a hypothesis for
the likely concentration of copper in the river and is given a discrete probability.
While mathematically more complex, the basic logic for applying Bayes's theorem is
the same.
320 Id. (manuscript at 18). In this example, the expected value of the posterior
distribution was used for the predicted value.
321 For comparison, the equivalent frequentist estimate (i.e., using a null (normal)
distribution centered at 46 pg/I) would generate a 95% confidence interval that
ranged from 47 to 54 pg/l. Id. From this result, a frequentist would conclude that
the null hypothesis is false and that one can infer that the regulatory standard is being
violated.
322 In the paper from which this example was taken, the author estimates that a
Bayesian would have to collect more than six times the number of measurements
before concluding that the regulatory standard was violated. Id. (manuscript at 23).
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assumes, among other things, that such experiments exist and will be
accepted without controversy, as well as that all concerned will agree
on the hypotheses that should be considered. These constraints
markedly qualify the power of Bayesian analysis to provide objective
probability estimates for statistical inference. 32 3 Part IV.B examines
these limitations in greater detail.

B. Bayesian and Frequentist Methods in Environment Policy
Bayes's theorem, according to its proponents, provides a rigorously logical technique for attaining agreement among scientists on
the most probable of several competing hypotheses (e.g., the toxicity
of a chemical for a range of exposure levels).324 An obvious question
is how rapidly Bayesian analysis causes the opinions of scientists to converge; in particular, if a large amount of data is required, agreement
may be foreclosed as a practical matter. Several requirements must be
met in order for Bayesian analysis to converge, but just two,
probability assignment and hypothesis selection, will be discussed
here.3 25 For purposes of this discussion, description of the other requirements is unnecessary because the two selected factors amply illustrate the practical limitations of Bayesian methods.
The first requirement is that scientists assign a probability to each
of the hypotheses being evaluated. 326 While this judgment may be
relatively straightforward for simple experimental systems, such as a
series of coin-flipping experiments, it becomes much more variable
and complex for nonuniform experimental information:
It is not just that different Bayesian agents will give different estimates of rates of convergence but that there may be no useful way
to form the estimates. To form an estimate for a given [case] we
need to know what kind of evidence is received and also what bits
are received in what order .... [I]n the general case, the relevant
a form the order [in
evidence can come in myriad forms, and within
32 7
which it is obtained] can matter critically.
To understand why this is the case, it is helpful to consider why
simple experimental systems are distinctive. In a simple stochastic ex323 Examples include uncertainties in the additivity of probabilities and the limits
of strict conditionalism. See EARmAN, supra note 31, at 41; FOSTER & HUBER, supra

note 82, at 129-30. Note that for subjective Bayesians this is not a problem, as they do
not believe that objective probabilities can be obtained. See supra note 299.
324 Suppes, supra note 316, at 204.
325 EARMAN, supra note 31, at 139-42, 148-49.
326 Id. at 143, 148; B. Efron, Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?, 40 AM. STATISTICIAN 1, 2
(1986).
327 EARMAN, supra note 31, at 148-49.
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periment, the only information that is relevant is the final tally of the
experimental observations, e.g., the number of heads versus tails for a
coin or the relative number of green and blue taxis in the earlier cab
328
example.
Most experimental data are not uniformly equivalent and thus
cannot be simply added together like a sequence of coin-flips, which
are simply reported as either heads or tails. In the case of a chemical
risk assessment, all available toxicological studies must be evaluated,
but few (if any) of them will have been conducted under identical
conditions. Experimental parameters will vary, including study type
(e.g., animal versus human, in vivo versus in vitro), exposure levels
329
and controls, and confounding variables that could bias the results.
For example, some data may derive from epidemiological studies of
exposed workers for which exposure conditions were poorly controlled and inaccurately known; other testing may involve carefully
controlled animal studies, but the animal model may not be well justified.3 3 0

These differences preclude data from distinct experiments

being quantitatively inter-translatable. As a result, interpretation of
data from multiple experiments requires scientists to judge how data
from each experiment are to be weighted and integrated. Data will
therefore influence scientists' opinions to different degrees and in
ways that depend on other information. 33 1 Consequently, because
many different paths will exist for information to be obtained, this
interpretive interdependence makes it impossible to predict when
Bayesian convergence of opinion will occur.
The second requirement for convergence is that scientists be
"equally dogmatic" at the outset, that is assign zero probability to (i.e.,
reject) the same candidate hypotheses. 332 Such agreement might be
attained by establishing "a rule of mutual respect that enjoins members of a scientific community to accord a nonzero [probability] to
any hypothesis seriously proposed by a member of the community. ' 333
Indeed, this approach might be viable with a small group of scientists
328

See supra Part W.A.1.

329

See, e.g., Green, supra note 229, at 649-53; Wagner, Toxic Risk Regulation, supra

note 5, at 1621-27.
330 Experimental variability also is significant in climate change science, where
scientists must rely on climate measurements taken under a wide range of conditions
and using a broad variety of techniques. HARVEY, supra note 149, at 76-77; IPCC,
supra note 183, at 249.
331 EARMAN, supra note 31, at 56, 149, 151-53.
332 Id. at 142. Requiring equal dogmatism is also clearly contrary to Popper's critical mode. Id. at 139, 148-49, 160; HACKING, supra note 12, at 181, 257; see supra Part

II.B.
333

EARMAN,

supra note 31, at 142.
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working on an esoteric problem. It is difficult to imagine, however,
that one could convince the community of toxicologists, including
those working in industry, government, and nonprofits, to agree in
principle on such an approach. Industry scientists, for example,
might reject (i.e., assign zero probability to) a hypothesis that chemicals are harmful even at extremely low levels, whereas environmentalists would rule out the hormesis hypothesis, which maintains that lowlevel exposure to industrial chemicals can be beneficial. Bayesian
analysis requires that such differences be resolved up front. Moreover, even if it were possible to achieve such an agreement, you would
still encounter widely divergent interpretations of the available data,
which would make the likelihood of convergence of opinion at best
speculative. The rigor of Bayes's theorem is therefore achieved at a
significant price, for it requires that all of the relevant theories be fully
3 34
elaborated and agreed to at the start.
The limited power of Bayes's theorem to harmonize divergent
opinions magnifies the significance of a scientist's starting prior distribution

in

Bayesian

analyses. 3 35

The

water-sampling

example

presented in Part IV.A.2 illustrated this problem. The industry scientist's prior distribution in that example lowered the estimated mean
contaminant level by almost 29% relative to the value for the collected
data. 33 6 Scientists' subjectively derived prior distributions are there-

fore bound to influence greatly, if not determine, the outcome of
Bayesian assessments in fields like environmental science where data
are often limited. 3 37 Drawing on Thomas Kuhn's work, a charitable
assessment of Bayesian methods might be that they have significant
value for normal science; however, even normal science generates
338 It
conflicting hypotheses and divergent opinions among scientists.
is difficult not to conclude that the failed objectivity of Bayesian methods seriously undermines their utility.
Undeterred, Bayesians are quick to point out that frequentist
methods have important drawbacks, too. In particular, frequentit
methods can be ill suited to environmental science:
From an ecological perspective, there are many difficulties with [frequentism]. Within experiments, true randomization is difficult,
334 Id. at 123-25; Efron, supra note 326, at 2.
335 EARMAN, supra note 31, at 138.
336 See supra Part IV.A.2.
337 EAmAN, supra note 31, at 161. Some theorists have argued that this substantive bias ought to be acknowledged up front and that debate over and development of
potential hypotheses should be integrated into the Bayesian program. See id. at
182-85, 198-203.
338 Id. at 172-73, 198.
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replication is often small, misidentified, or by virtue of circumstance, nonexistent. Ecological experiments rarely are repeated independently. No two organisms are exactly alike, and consequently
they are unlikely to respond to our treatment in exactly the same
way. Evolution virtually guarantees that even if they were alike today, their offspring will be measurably different. Thus, the idea that
there is a true, fixed value [i.e., long-run frequency] for any ecologi339
cally meaningful statistical parameter is a Platonic phantom.
These problems undoubtedly pose critical dilemmas for how frequentist methods are applied and interpreted. It is less clear, though,
whether they justify abandoning frequentist methods for Bayesian
analysis. Bayesians typically make arguments about the logical rigor of
Bayesian analysis, as well as its ability to handle many types or even
small amounts of data. 340 While it is difficult to argue against logic,
this virtue is not realized without its attendant costs. Bayesian logic
requires that candidate hypotheses be mutually exclusive and exhaustive and that scientists agree on the hypotheses that will be considered. These requirements are problematic for environmental science,
which is often speculative and hotly contested. Furthermore, the
value of rigorous inductive logic under these circumstances is less
compelling, as it risks meaning little more than being consistently
wrong. Simple deductive or inductive logic on its own, as Popper and
3 41
Kuhn showed, does not guarantee good science.2
Bayesian environmental scientists argue most passionately about
the power of Bayesian methods to generate clear quantitative data,
which they believe are essential if environmental science is to be used
effectively in policymaking. 342 Bayesian advocates, such as Dr. Stephen Schneider (mentioned in the Introduction) argue "that policy
analysts need probability estimates to assess the seriousness of the implied [environmental] impacts; otherwise they would be left to work
out the implicit probability assignments for themselves." 3 43 Bayesians
claim, and apparently believe, that policymakers should concur, that it
is better "to put more trust in the probability estimates of [environmental scientists] -however subjective-than those of the myriad special interests that have been encouraged to make their own
[predictions] ."344 For many environmental scientists, such claims ignore the risk that Bayesian methods will further politicize environ339
340
341
342
343
344

Ellison, supra note 23, at 1037 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1037-38, 1043.
See supra Part II.B.
See Schneider, supra note 23, at 17-18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
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mental science and damage its already often-tenuous credibility.
Bayesian probability estimates appear to them as hopelessly muddled
because Bayesian probability amalgamates objective frequencies (experimental data) with subjective judgments (prior distributions),
thereby contaminating both with individual biases. 345 Much like the
Mendelian-biometrics dispute discussed in Part II.C, frequentists and
Bayesians talk past each other because they cannot agree on a basic
framework or principles for scientific inference.
The choice between Bayesian and frequentist methods ultimately
turns on one's view of the merits of a holistic logical approach versus
procedural objectivist methods. Their relative values cannot be
judged in the abstract. Jeffreys used Bayesian methods very successfully in his work in meteorology and astrophysics, while Fisher's frequentist methods greatly improved plant genetics research and the
agricultural sciences.3 46 At bottom, however, environmental science is
not ideally suited to either frequentist or Bayesian methods. The interpretive circuitousness and experimental constraints of frequentist
methods inhibit their effective use by environmental scientists and
policymakers. Similarly, the contentious politics, theoretical uncertainties, and limited data found in environmental policymaking all
suggest that the Bayesian mixing of judgment and data could further
fuel existing disputes by obscuring the solid data and theories that do
exist. Frequentists' separation of data analysis (i.e., stage-two statistical inference) from stage-three scientific judgments is often of vital
importance to the credibility of environmental science. Ultimately, a
flexible approach that is responsive to specific contexts is what is
needed.
C.

Effectively Integrating Science into Environmental Policymaking

Institutional developments in climate change science policy provide a potential model that integrates the proposals found in the legal
and scientific debates over the proper role of scientific judgment in
environmental science. 347 Drawing on the parallels already noted between Justice Breyer's expert model and Bayesian methods and between Professor Wagner's procedural scheme and frequentism, this
approach rests on the belief that the legal and scientific debates
should not be treated separately. Instead, statistical methods should
be used in tandem with legal and institutional mechanisms to control
345 HOWIE, supra note 37, at 161-62; Efron, supra note 326, at 3-4.
346 See supra Part I.
347 See Mark Schrope, Consensus Science, or Consensus Politics?, 412
113-14 (2001).
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how scientific judgment is used in environmental policymaking. The
climate change research community is already, in effect, considering a
strategy that would combine a well developed institutional structure
348
with a Bayesian approach to calculating climate change predictions.
Under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), formal procedures exist for drafting scientific reports and attaining consensus among its scientific membership. 349 The use of Bayesian
methods is already being debated within the IPCC, and if embraced
would be particularly noteworthy given the scientific complexity and
3 50
political importance of climate change science.
The IPCC system represents a promising approach to integrating
scientific judgment into environmental policy. This model recognizes
that the function of statistics in science is analogous to the role of
procedures and institutional structures in law-they both operate as
frameworks for ensuring that judgments are transparent and consistent with applicable rules and principles. At the same time, it is clear
that environmental policy is reliant on scientific judgments shaped by
statistical methods, which mayenhance or detract from existing legal
measures. Bayesian probabilities, for instance, are less transparent to
public scrutiny because they incorporate subjective judgments and objective data into a single quantitative estimate. By considering statistical and legal mechanisms together, lawyers, scientists, and
348

See, e.g., L. Mark Berliner et al., Bayesian Climate Change Assessment, 13 J. CLI3805 (2000); Chris E. Forest et al., Quantiying Uncertainties in Climate System
Properties with the Use of Recent Climate Observations, 295 SCIENCE 113 (2002); Giles, supra
note 23, at 476-78; Roger N. Jones, Managing Uncertainty in Climate Change Projections-Issues for Impact Assessment, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 403 (2000); Schneider, supra
note 23, at 17-18; T.M.L. Wigley & S.C.B. Raper, Interpretation of High Projectionsfor
Global-Mean Warming, 293 SCIENCE 451 (2001). These references encompass Bayesian
MATE

methods that are applied within specific climate models and used as a meta-analytic
method to combine information from diverse models and experiments and to generate a final quantitative prediction of future climate change. It appears that the latter
meta-analytical method is receiving more attention and opposition than the former.
See Giles, supra note 23, at 476-77; Schneider, supra note 23, at 17-18.
349 See IPCC, supra note 183, at iii-vi; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, About IPCC, at http://www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2003). The IPCC draws scientists from universities, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. Id. Climate change research has required a careful balancing of consensus processes and critical debate. See IPCC, supra note 183, at v-vi;
Thomas J. Crowley, Causes of Climate Change Over the Past 1000 Years, 289

SCIENCE

270,

271-72 (2000) (discussing competing hypotheses for climate change that scientists
have had to rule out to conclude that climate change is from anthropogenic sources).
350 See Giles, supra note 23, at 476-77; Arnulf Grubler & Nebojsz Nakicenovic,
Letter to the Editor, Identifying Dangers in an Uncertain Climate, 412

Schneider, supra note 23, at 17-18.
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policymakers will gain added flexibility and be in a position to integrate the different mechanisms more effectively.
A complementary strategy, as the IPCC example suggests, could
employ legal procedures and institutional structures to counterbalance expertise based Bayesian methods. 35' Just as in the legal context,
the added procedures would mitigate potential problems with individual bias. Procedural mechanisms could include justifications of critical scientific judgments (e.g., how experimental results are weighted),
consideration of a range of hypotheses or prior distributions, or calculation of Bayesian probabilities under a range of starting assumptions.
Institutional measures might consist of balanced membership requirements or consensus processes, much like those associated with the
IPCC. Integrating legal procedures and statistical methods in this
manner provides a general analytic framework, Bayesian or frequentist, for matching legal procedures with critical scientific judgments.
Importantly, this approach differs from Wagner's judicial review proposal, which is reliant on scientists and judges, because it uses broadly
applicable statistical frameworks to identify important scientific judgments, rather than a case-by-case approach based on separating science from policy. Similarly, it has advantages over Breyer's proposal
insofar as it incorporates procedural mechanisms that mitigate the potential influence of individual bias and political pressures, which
Breyer's approach gives short shrift.
Such an integrated approach also could match statistical and legal mechanisms based on whether the relevant science is better served
by Bayesian or frequentist methods. Ecological studies, for example,
that are less amenable to frequentist analyses could be conducted using Bayesian methods and subjected to additional procedural requirements, such as requiring scientists to explain the rationale for their
choice of prior distribution. As a general rule, frequentist methods
will be better suited to areas of science where mathematical sophistication is lower, divisive disciplinary controversies are common, and
large-scale controlled experimental testing dominates. Bayesian
methods will be preferred. where mathematical sophistication is
higher, disciplinary consensus is more attainable, and observational
studies dominate or, as in the case of many ecology studies, statistical
long-run frequencies are elusive. These are clearly generalizations,
though, that must be re-examined in particular contexts.
351 Alternatively, one could combine Breyer's expert model with frequentist methods (i.e., preclude Bayesian analysis); however, without some kind of further integration this would be little different than the status quo, given the dominance of
frequentist methods in environmental science.
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Taking advantage of the interplay between statistical methods, legal procedures, and institutional mechanisms in shaping expert judgment has the potential to expand the range of options available to
guide scientific judgment in environmental policy. Moreover, by linking law and science in this manner, this approach will promote a
deeper appreciation among lawyers and policymakers of the limits
and strengths of scientific methods and among scientists of the important role that legal procedures and institutions play in environmental
law. Both stand to improve how science is used in environmental
policymaking.
CONCLUSION

This Article has analyzed the relationship between scientific judgment and statistics in environmental policy, and has described the
competing Bayesian and frequentist approaches to statistical inference. As we have seen, expert judgments are important at each stage
of the three-part framework described in the Introduction-experimental quantification, inferences from discrete scientific studies, and
integrated scientific assessments. Stage one shows how substantive scientific uncertainties introduce ambiguities that weaken statistical tests,
and reveals the importance of using a variety of experimental methods that are independent of the hypothesis being investigated. It also
exposes the difficult balancing that is required to protect the integrity
of science while ensuring transparency and political accountability.
Stage two demonstrates the role of frequentist methods in shaping
scientific judgments and reveals how common misapprehensions
about them have hampered efforts to alleviate the systemic benignuntil-proven-guilty bias of traditional significance tests. It also reveals
that statistical tests are more flexible than their skeptics appreciate
and proposes a remarkably underutilized method-equivalence testing-to address this bias. Equivalence testing ought to be a standard
technique in environmental science, as it already is in medicine under
FDA regulations.
Stage three exposes the limitations of both Bayesian and frequentist methods. Just as Breyer's and Wagner's regulatory proposals have
proven incomplete in environmental law, so too are Bayesian and frequentist methods imperfectly suited to environmental science. While
these limitations cannot be completely overcome, they can be mitigated by using statistical methods in tandem with legal procedures
and institutional mechanisms. Indeed, many similarities exist between the legal debate over the appropriate role of expert judgment
in environmental policymaking and the growing dispute among envi-
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ronmental scientists over statistics. Lawyers and scientists have both
adopted procedural and expert based strategies, but where lawyers
rely on institutional structures and administrative procedures, scientists employ Bayesian and frequentist methods, respectively. These
parallels should aid lawyers in grasping how statistics influences environmental policy. They also suggest that decisions regarding statistical methods and legal measures should not be isolated from each
other and that the integrated model proposed in Part IV.C promises
to strike the right balance between science and politics in environmental policymaking.
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